

Quebec 1759



QUEBEC 1759

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1.0 Mapboard
- 2.0 Units
- 3.0 Deployment
- 4.0 Sequence of Play
- 5.0 Victory Conditions
- 6.0 Land Moves
- 7.0 Amphibious Moves
- 8.0 Ship Moves
- 9.0 Writing Orders
- 10.0 Leaders
- 11.0 Battles
- 12.0 Battle Deployment
- 13.0 Battle Resolution
- 14.0 Firing Units
- 15.0 Retreats
- 16.0 Routs/Pursuit
- 17.0 Amphibious Combat
- 18.0 Skirmishes
- 19.0 St. Charles River
- 20.0 Quebec Militia
- 21.0 Montreal Supplies
- 22.0 Indians
- 23.0 Tides
- 24.0 Strategy

1.0 THE MAPBOARD

1.1 The land areas on the mapboard contain ten ZONES: Montmorency, Beauport, St. Charles, Abraham, Ste. Foy, Cap Rouge, Sillery, Etchemin, Levis, and Ile d'Orleans. The black lines connecting some of these zones are roads.

1.2 The St. Lawrence River is divided into two AREAS, separated by the broken line crossing the river near the middle of the mapboard. These areas are named Bason and St. Laurent.

2.0 UNITS

2.1 The game contains 50 units: 25 red (British) and 25 blue (French), representing the regiments, militia, Indians, and ships involved. The various regimental units are historically accurate; the militia, Indian, and ships are symbolic of the forces involved. Labels from the self-adhesive, die-cut sheet enclosed must be attached to the face of each

unit; red labels on the red blocks, blue labels on the blue blocks.

2.2 The combat values (CV) of units (the declining series of small squares around the edges) range from 4cv to 1cv. This varies with the quantity and class of troops a unit represents. Ships do not participate in combat and cannot be eliminated.

2.3 Units stand on edge, label identifications facing the owning player. This prevents opponents from seeing enemy unit strengths or types. This system portrays "fog of war" conditions in a simple and elegant manner. Ships are played face-up on the mapboard.

2.4 Units are designed for step-reduction. Each unit begins play with its maximum CV along the top edge of the unit. This initial CV remains constant until reduced in battle, recorded by turning the unit until the new, lesser CV lies along the top. Thus a unit beginning play at 3cv can be progressively reduced to 2cv and 1cv as it sustains casualties. A unit reduced below 1cv is eliminated.

2.5 Players may transfer CV between units in the SAME zone, by reducing one unit and increasing another by the same amount. This must be done before orders are revealed for any Campaign Move (never after); the units involved may still move in that turn.

2.6 Both players have 1cv units (detachments) that function like other infantry units in all respects. They replace the "decoy" units from earlier editions of the game.

3.0 GAME SET-UP

3.1 Lay the mapboard out on a table between both players. The French player sits facing south, the British player facing north.

3.2 Deploy all units on the mapboard at their maximum CV. Units are located on (or near) a zone name to indicate position. There may be any number of units in any zone at any time.

3.3 The British player deploys all army units on the Ile d'Orleans and all ships in the Bason.

3.4 The French player deploys all units in as many or as few of the nine remaining zones as he wishes.

4.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY

4.1 There are 16 Campaign Moves in the game. Players get 1 move per turn which can be a land move, a ship move, or an amphibious move.

4.2 In each Campaign Move, both players write orders on a slip of paper and both plays are revealed simultaneously. [See: 9.0]. A player is not compelled to move, but Campaign Moves cannot be saved for future use.

4.3 When units of opposing players end up in the same zone, a battle occurs which must be resolved before the next Campaign Move is played. See 13.0.

5.0 VICTORY

5.1 The British must hold the ABRAHAM zone at the end of the sixteenth (16th) Campaign Move, after any battles in this turn have been resolved. Occupation of the Abraham zone at an earlier time is NOT a British victory; they must hold it until the 16th Campaign Move has been played. The British must also have a minimum of 20cv remaining on the mapboard, but all of these need NOT be in Abraham.

5.2 The French player wins if the British player fails to achieve his objective or if the British strength falls below the minimum 20CV at any time in the game. There is no condition for a tie game.

QUEBEC 1759

6.0 LAND MOVEMENT

6.1 A land move is made from one zone to another zone or zones along a connecting road. All units in one zone are called a **group**. Only one group can move per turn. The group can move to one or more adjacent zones if directly connected by road. A player is not required to move every unit in a group.

EXAMPLES

- *Levis to Etchemin.*
- *Cap Rouge to Sillery and/or Ste. Foy.*

However, units in Sillery can not move to Ste. Foy because both zones are not directly connected by road. Units in St. Charles could not move to Ste. Foy for the same reason.

7.0 AMPHIBIOUS MOVES

7.1 Five of the ten zones on the mapboard, namely: Ile d'Orleans, Levis, St. Charles, Beauport, and Montmorency, all border on the BASON river area. The remaining zones, (except Ste. Foy which is landlocked) all border on the ST LAURENT river area. Note: Quebec City is NOT a zone and Abraham does NOT border on the Bason.

7.2 An amphibious move is made across a river area from one zone to another zone (zones) which is (are) within the SAME area. That is, units in any one of Ile d'Orleans,

Levis, St. Charles, Beauport, or Montmorency, may move to any one or more of these zones. And, units in Cap Rouge, Sillery, Abraham, or Etchemin may move to any one or more of these zones.

7.3 Unlike land moves, zones need not be adjacent. But a move between zones bordering on different river areas can never be made as an amphibious move. Thus units in Levis could NOT move to Abraham because the two zones border on different river areas.

7.4 The number of units either player can move amphibiously in one Campaign Move depends on the location of **British** ships. Regardless of what the British player does, the French player may NEVER make amphibious moves between zones in the Bason area, and can move a maximum of 4 units in the St. Laurent area. This maximum decreases by one unit for every British naval unit located in the St. Laurent area, until with all 4 ships upriver, the French player can make no amphibious moves. The British player may move one army unit amphibiously for every naval unit in that area. Thus with three ships in the Bason (one naval unit has moved upriver) a maximum of three units may move amphibiously between zones in the Bason area.

7.5 When possible, some units in a zone may use land movement while different units in the SAME zone use amphibious movement.

8.0 SHIP MOVEMENT


8.1 To move ships from one river area to the other, the British player must order this for his Campaign Move, and can make no other moves in that same turn. In one Campaign Move, a maximum of two ships may be moved upriver (Bason to St. Laurent) but any number may be moved downriver.

8.2 Army units may not accompany ships moving up or down river.

9.0 WRITING ORDERS

9.1 Each turn a player gets to write one order. It must state the number of units to be moved, the zone of origin, and the zone or zones of destination. For example: "4 units Ile d'Orleans to Beauport" (amphibious move), **or** "6 units Ste. Foy to Abraham and 3 units Ste. Foy to Cap Rouge", **or** "all units stand", **or** "2 ships upriver", etc.

9.2 Once orders are revealed, they can NOT be changed and MUST be carried out (if possible). If an illegal order has been written ("3 units from Levis to Abraham") none of the units involved move this turn.



Land Moves →

Amphibious Moves →

St. Charles River Move →

QUEBEC 1759

Note: when a player has a choice of units to fulfill his order, he may send whichever units he wishes to simulate a degree of 'local initiative'.

9.3 To save time, players may wish to use a shorthand form of writing orders. We suggest: Abraham [AB], Beauport [BE], Cap Rouge [CR], Etchemin [ET], Ile d'Orleans [OR], Levis [LE], Montmorency [MO], Sillery [SI], St. Charles [SC], Ste. Foy [SF], Bason [BA], and St. Laurent [SL]. Thus, 3 LE-ET is shorthand for "3 units from Levis to Etchemin".

10.0 LEADERS


10.1 Both sides have one leader, Montcalm (French) and Wolfe (British). These leaders function like other infantry units, but also have two special powers.

10.2 A leader may move one or two zones by land movement.

10.3 A leader deployed in battle rolls two dice each firing turn, but is killed (eliminated) if a double is thrown. Double 6 scores two hits, but the leader is also killed.

11.0 BATTLES

11.1 Battles occur when opposing units meet in the same zone and



BATTLE DEPLOYMENT EXAMPLE

A battle has occurred in the St. Charles zone. Eight French units have been deployed into three columns with no reserve. Five British units have been deployed into three columns with a single unit in reserve.

must be resolved before any further Campaign Moves are made. Battles may occur in one of three ways:

- *One player moves units to a zone containing enemy units or both players move to a zone which **already** contains units of one player. The player with units **already** in the zone is the "defender".*
- *Both players move units to the same **empty** zone. The French player is always the defender in such battles.*
- *Both players move units to the zone each is moving from. For example, British units in Levis move to Etchemin, and French units in this zone move to Levis. The battle is fought in the zone from which the weaker force came (measured in units) or, if both forces are equal in number, in the zone of the French player's choice. The defender is the player who controlled the battle zone at the **start** of the turn.*

11.2 Two or more battles in different zones may occur at the same time. When this happens the French player decides in which order the battles will be fought, each battle being concluded before another begins.

11.3 Movement of units between zones on the mapboard during a battle, other than retreats, is not permitted. A battle is fought with the units in the battle zone only; reinforcements are not allowed.

12.0 BATTLE DEPLOYMENT

12.1 The defender deploys his units in the zone into three columns (see diagram below) without revealing the CV's of units involved. There may be any number of units in any one column, but there must always be at least one unit in each column. [Exception: see 18.0] Any number of units may also be deployed in "reserve" behind these columns.

12.2 The attacker now deploys his units in the zone into three opposing columns and reserve (optional) as he

wishes. The defender may not alter his deployment after the attacker begins to deploy.

12.3 Both players now reveal the CV's of the units deployed in columns by tilting them forward face-up so that the current CV's of units face the opposing columns. Reserve units (if any) are NOT revealed at this time.

12.4 Once a battle commences, players are not allowed to redeploy units in columns, only units in reserve, and only one reserve unit per battle turn may be so redeployed.

13.0 BATTLE RESOLUTION

13.1 A battle is fought to conclusion by an indeterminate number of battle turns, each turn resolved in the following sequence:

- The Defender has the option to retreat (see: 15.0).*
- The Defender may add ONE unit from his reserve (if any) to any one column of his choice.*
- The Defender may now fire (see 14.0) all his units in the three columns, one unit at a time, one column at a time, in any order he chooses.*
- The Attacker now repeats these steps in the same sequence, retreating, or deploying from reserve and firing units as he wishes.*

13.2 The battle turn sequence above is repeated until one player decides to retreat, or until one player is routed (see: 16.0). After a battle ends, surviving units are turned back "on edge" at their current CV levels.

14.0 FIRING UNITS

14.1 Only units deployed in battle columns may fire; reserve units may not fire or be fired at. Units in one column must always fire at units in the opposing column, except during pursuit fire.

QUEBEC 1759

14.2 A unit is fired by noting its current CV and rolling the same number of dice. For every "6" thrown on each die, a unit in the opposite enemy column is IMMEDIATELY reduced by 1 CV. The owner always decides which unit or units will be reduced.

EXAMPLE: *To fire a unit of 4CV, a player will roll 4 dice. If two "6's" were thrown the opposing player would immediately reduce one unit by 2 CV or two units by 1 CV each. A unit is reduced by turning it (anti-clockwise) until the new lesser CV faces the opposing player.*

15.0 RETREATS

15.1 A player wishing to retreat from a battle must do so before firing any units in that firing turn. The Defender may NOT retreat until the beginning of his second battle turn; the Attacker may retreat at the beginning of his first battle turn.

15.2 The retreating player must retreat all units at the same time (partial retreats are not allowed, except 17.2) and all units must retreat to the same zone. The defender can retreat to any zone (subject to all normal movement rules) except a zone occupied by enemy units or the zone the attacker came from, even if now vacant. The attacker can only retreat to the zone he came from, but not if occupied by enemy units. Neither player may retreat to a zone that contains another battle yet to be resolved. If a player has no legal retreat he must remain in the battle.

16.0 ROUTS/PURSUIT

16.1 When all units in any one opposing column are eliminated (surplus hits, if any, are ignored) the outflanked player is routed. He must immediately retreat, subject to all retreating rules (15.0, 17.2). Units which can not retreat for any reason are eliminated.

16.2 The "victorious" player is then given one additional (normal) fire by all units (including reserve units) to reflect pursuit. The routed player may take pursuit fire casualties on any unit(s) he wishes.

16.3 If the routed player has units in RESERVE when the rout occurs, one pursuit fire hit is ignored for each 2CV (rounded up) in reserve.

17.0 AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT

17.1 When a player attacks by Sea move, the defender in the battle/skirmish fires each of his deployed units at double CV (double the number of dice) on his first battle turn. Thereafter, normal battle procedure is followed. If any or all of the defender's units have moved to the battle zone also by sea move in the same turn, these units do not receive this advantage.

17.2 A player may retreat by amphibious movement but the number of units involved may not exceed the maximum for a legal amphibious move. In addition, an amphibious retreat involves pursuit fire from the victorious player for a retreat and double pursuit fire (double the # of dice) if routed.

18.0 SKIRMISHES

If one player (or both) has less than three units in a battle zone (thus preventing a three column deployment) battle columns and reserve are ignored. Players deploy in a single "skirmish" column, exchanging fire as normal. Retreats are conducted as before, but there can be no rout and no pursuit fire, unless an amphibious retreat is involved.

19.0 ST. CHARLES RIVER

The St. Charles River was a good line of defence. To reflect this terrain obstacle, any land move from St. Charles to Abraham (or vice-versa)

is treated as an amphibious attack/retreat, except there is no limitation on the number of army units moving or with tides.

20.0 QUEBEC MILITIA

Wolfe exploited a tendency for the militia to desert by issuing a proclamation that he would destroy all crops in farms where it was apparent that the menfolk were absent to fill the ranks of the militia. To reflect this, the French player must remove one Quebec Militia unit (of any CV) for every zone occupied (for the first time) by the British player except for Ile d'Orleans. This loss is effective **immediately**, but only as long as there are Quebec Militia still in play.

21.0 MONTREAL SUPPLIES

The French were dependent on supplies from Montreal. To reflect this, if the British player occupies the Cap Rouge zone, the French player must eliminate one Montreal/Trois Rivieres militia unit (any CV) at the **end of every** Campaign Move (after combat). This penalty begins with the next move and lasts until there are no more Montreal/Trois Rivieres militia units in play.

22.0 INDIANS

The Ottawa warriors supporting the French were superb guerilla fighters, but were unreliable allies and did not care for pitched battles. To reflect these conditions, the Ottawa unit has the following special options and restrictions.

22.1 Movement: If the French player wishes to move the Ottawa unit, this is the **only** order he can write this turn. The Indian unit can move to ANY zone on the mapboard. The normal restrictions of land and amphibious movement do NOT apply. Thus, the Ottawa unit can move to Ile d'Orleans, even from Cap Rouge if desired.

QUEBEC 1759

22.2 Raiding: The Ottawa unit may conduct a raid in its destination zone. This is done by immediately attacking once at double CV (double the number of dice) and then immediately retreating to ANY zone not occupied by British units and not a battle zone. The British player may return fire (not doubled) only with the Light Infantry or American Ranger units if present. Casualties inflicted by the Ottawa unit may be taken on units of the British player's choice, and he need reveal only the units reduced.

22.3 Scouting: The Ottawa unit may "scout" the destination zone, but may not raid in the same move. To do this, up to four (4) British units in the zone (chosen by the French player at random) are revealed. The Ottawa unit may then retreat to any zone as in 22.2 and may not be attacked.

22.4 Battles: The Ottawa unit may NOT be deployed in a battle column. It must be kept in reserve but gets double CV (double the number of dice) pursuit fire in routs. The Ottawa unit can be used in a skirmish (fighting at single CV) but NEVER by itself. The Ottawa unit

may retreat to any zone as in 22.2 and is never subject to pursuit fire.

22.5 The Ottawa unit retires from the game **immediately** (even during a battle/skirmish) if reduced to 1cv, or if the total French strength falls below 10cv (in other units).

23.0 TIDES [OPTIONAL]

To simulate the inconvenience of tides to military planning, the British player should roll one die before each Campaign Move. If a "1" is thrown, amphibious movement (for both players) and movement of ships is NOT allowed for that Campaign Move.


24.0 STRATEGY

The initial French deployment is very important. It is only really necessary to deploy in four zones since the British player must attack one of Levis, Montmorency, Beauport, or St. Charles by amphibious move to open the campaign. The "safe" deployment

is to allocate relatively equal strength to all four zones, with some emphasis on Levis and St. Charles.

However, surprise and "unsafe" deployment can be the essence of victory. With the aid of smaller detachments the French player should be able to plan some nasty surprises for the British player. Once the campaign has opened, the French player will maximize his chances of victory with a defensive and delaying strategy.

The "burden of attack" falls to the British player. He has superior mobility due to his ships and must use this advantage to create problems for his opponent by subtle feints. The British player has two main strategies open to him. (1) Attack one of the north bank zones (Beauport, St. Charles, or Montmorency) win the zone, consolidate, and then advance on Abraham. (2) Attack Levis with the intention of occupying Etchemin and then Cap Rouge, Sillery, or Abraham. A third option is to combine both of these strategies by feinting one then pursuing the other.



QUEBEC 1759

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY

In the spring of 1759 an immense British fleet, in excess of 250 warships and transports, assembled at Louisbourg on the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) had engulfed Europe and the struggles of the Old World spread to the New.

In North America, France controlled a sweeping arc of territory from the mouth of the St. Lawrence at Louisbourg to the mouth of the Mississippi at New Orleans. The more populous British colonies were effectively pinned along the eastern seaboard. For almost a century, Anglo-French rivalry in North America resulted in a sporadic struggle for frontier forts known as the French and Indian War. Given the impetus of the European War, the British, led by the energetic William Pitt, resolved to crush the French presence in North America. The French fortress of Louisbourg fell to a British siege in the summer of 1758. The capture of Quebec, capital and birthplace of New France, was their strategic goal for 1759.

The British campaign against Quebec was carefully planned. General Amherst was to lead an attack from New York up the Hudson valley against Montreal as a diversion. The direct assault on Quebec was to be up the St. Lawrence by the armada being assembled at Louisbourg. Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders commanded this fleet. The army it would transport was entrusted to Brigadier-General James Wolfe.

The youthful Wolfe, a lanky red-headed Englishman who had served with distinction in the capture of Louisbourg, was an unlikely hero. While few will deny his tactical competence, and none his courage, his skill as a military commander was suspect. As a

victim of tuberculosis he always seemed more likely to succumb to illness than to die with glory on the battlefield. He was moody, shy, and awkward in public. Although he was popular with the rank and file he had the greatest difficulty in communicating with his three brigadiers, George Townshend, Robert Moncton, and James Murray. Each of these men came to resent his indecisive, secretive, and wayward conduct in this campaign.

The French commander opposing Wolfe was a spirited aristocrat, short in height but long in name: Brigadier-General Louis Joseph Montcalm-Gazon, Marquis de Montcalm, Sieur de St. Veran. Montcalm had been posted to North America in 1756. Under his able leadership the thinly spread French forces gained a series of victories over the British, at Fort Oswego in 1756, Fort William-Henry in 1757, and Ticonderoga in 1758.

Montcalm's immediate problem, to defend Quebec, was not easy. He had less than 3000 regulars at his disposal and there was no chance of reinforcements from France due to British dominance in sea-power. The bulk of his army was composed of about 8500 militia drawn from Montreal, Trois Rivieres, and Quebec. While the regulars were the equal of most troops, the militia had little training, were prone to desertion, and were poorly equipped (they had no bayonets for example). Montcalm also had the lukewarm assistance of about 1200 Indians.

To compound his difficulties, Montcalm had to cope with a divided command. Vaudreuil, the Quebec-born Governor of the colony, took his role as Commander-in-Chief more seriously than his military skill warranted. Although instructed by the French Government to defer to Montcalm on military questions, Vaudreuil's vanity and distrust of French-born advisors, reinforced by personal and

petty jealousies, led him to interfere with the French general's orders at several key moments. It was an unfortunate circumstance for which Montcalm must be held partly responsible because of his open and tactless contempt for the Governor.


But the French position was far from hopeless. Montcalm's military talents were equal to his opponent's. He had opted for a defensive strategy and his position was one of the strongest in North America. Indeed, Quebec had a reputation of impregnability, having repulsed two similar attacks in the past. Montcalm need only frustrate the British for a few summer months and they would have to retreat back to Louisbourg to avoid the winter freeze-up.

THE CAMPAIGN

The British fleet sailed from Louisbourg on June 1st and anchored off Ile d'Orleans a little over three weeks later. The army was immediately disembarked and encamped on the island without opposition. Wolfe had ten battalions of regulars organized into three brigades, six companies of American Rangers, and two temporary formations of grenadiers and light infantry formed from troops left behind to garrison Louisbourg; a total of 8500 disciplined and well armed men.

Wolfe must have been delighted to discover the heights of Levis defended by a token force of a few hundred men. This proved costly for Montcalm. The position was taken, a battery quickly constructed, and over the next two months the city was subjected to a destructive cannonade.

The major problem facing Wolfe was clear. He must bring Montcalm to action in an open battle which both sides knew would favour the British. Although Wolfe had an advantage in being screened by Saunderson's fleet, which the French had nothing afloat to oppose, the



QUEBEC 1759

adverse terrain, tides and prevailing winds, severely restricted the use of naval craft. For this reason a proposed landing upriver at Sillery was rejected as being too risky. A frontal assault on the city in full view of its guns was even more impractical. The low and fearless Beauport shore offered what seemed to be the best avenue of attack. But Montcalm had anticipated this. The bulk of his army was deployed between the St. Charles and Montmorency rivers.

July passed quickly with alternate bouts of indecision and planning. Finally, on the last day of the month, Wolfe executed his first major attack, an amphibious assault on the French left at Montmorency. The attack proved to be a fiasco. After several clumsy feints, a disorganized landing was made on the tidal flats west of the river. In the resulting confusion about 1000 regulars broke ranks and stormed the French positions alone. They were easily repulsed. At the same time a sudden summer rainstorm deluged the scene. Footing became difficult and musket powder wet. The tide was now rising and Wolfe ordered a general retreat leaving behind 450 casualties. French casualties were negligible. That night, Montcalm and his subordinates, Levis and Bougainville, toasted their victory, confident that the Quebec campaign was as good as won.

After this defeat Wolfe was obliged to reconsider his strategy. Encouraging news was received from Amherst advancing unchecked on Montreal. The threat to Montcalm was clear and he was forced to send Levis and a few reinforcements to counter it. But Wolfe could find no way of pressing this advantage. He was ill, and the month of August slipped by with nothing accomplished. Time was running out. Frustrated by Wolfe's inaction and secretiveness, his brigadiers advocated a new plan. A landing upriver above the city would meet less opposition and would cut the vital French supply route to Montreal. Montcalm would then be forced to fight on British terms or be starved into submission. Wolfe reluctantly agreed because clearly an assault below Quebec was not the answer. Where should the landing be made? The brigadiers favoured a landing above Cap Rouge. Wolfe thought otherwise and after extensive reconnaissance, found his spot - a small cove two miles west of the city walls called Anse du Foulon (now called Wolfe's Cove). It was thinly defended and promised easy access to the open Plains of Abraham above. Wolfe kept this bold choice a secret - even from his brigadiers.

Throughout the first week of September Wolfe's army assembled at Levis and then marched to Etchemin. Montcalm, unaware of the number of men involved due to the impenetrable screen of the British fleet, viewed this activity upriver as yet another British feint. He detached only 1500 men under the command of

Bougainville and sent them to Cap Rouge to observe and counter any threat. In the meantime two brigades of British regulars embarked on a squadron of light ships upriver. They amused themselves, and drove Bougainville to near distraction, by drifting effortlessly with the tide, up and down the river, feinting here, feinting there, while Bougainville's meagre force scrambled back and forth mile after toilsome mile.

On the night of September 12th the British plan was put into effect. A feint was made above Cap Rouge to draw Bougainville upriver. Another feint was made by Saunders's fleet at Beauport to keep Montcalm's attention. Then under cover of darkness, a landing was made at Anse du Foulon. The small French garrison was quickly overpowered and British troops swarmed ashore. Ironically, a battalion of regulars had been ordered by Montcalm to that very cove on the same evening, but Vaudreuil intercepted and delayed the order.

WOLFE'S COVE


Dawn broke on September 13th to reveal 5000 British redcoats massed on the Plains of Abraham. The news was quickly relayed to Montcalm at Beauport. Vaudreuil remained convinced this landing was another British feint and insisted that 2000 troops remain in position. Montcalm grimly marched to the Plain with what men he could muster - about 5000. These were assembled on the Plains by 7am. Conferring with his subordinates, Montcalm decided to give battle before the British could consolidate their position. Bougainville was still at Cap Rouge and his 1500 men did not take part in the battle.

Montcalm's advance began at 9am. Half his army was deployed as skirmishers on the British flanks; the remainder advanced on the enemy center. The distance between the two armies quickly narrowed to 200 yards and the French lines began to fire at will. The British line remained silent.

On the French came. Gradually their line became ragged due to the militia custom of dropping to the ground to reload. With less than 100 yards between the two armies, the British troops suddenly advanced to within 40 yards, halted, and then fired a devastating volley. Quickly reloading, they advanced four paces and fired again, and then again. The disorganized French were helpless before this methodical advance. Within minutes the French ranks broke and retreated

in panic towards St. Charles. The British pursued and nothing could stop the rout. The four senior French officers at the battle, including Montcalm, were mortally wounded and French casualties exceeded 1500. By noon the shattered French army was in full flight up the St. Charles River valley towards Montreal. British casualties were less than 700 of which only 58 were fatal. But one of these was Wolfe.

The victorious British army quickly surrounded the city preparing for a long siege if necessary. It



was not. Abandoned by its army and devastated by bombardment, the city held out for five days, surrendering to Brigadier Townshend on September 18th.

The capture of Quebec did not end the Seven Years' War in North America but it made a British victory inevitable. Montreal surrendered in the following year after Levis, who succeeded Montcalm, made a gallant but futile attempt to recapture Quebec. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, New France was formally ceded to Britain. But if Britain had gained a new empire in North America, she unknowingly set in motion a chain of events which would lose her another. With the threat of French aggression removed, and new opportunities for western expansion, the British American colonies found time to brood on internal problems and speculate on the advantages of independence.

GAME DESIGN

Tom Dalgliesh, Lance Gutteridge, Steve Brewster.

