Columbia Games’ *Borodino 1812*: The Game As History

By: Carl Willner

Columbia’s “Borodino: Napoleon in Russia, 1812” game, published in the 200th anniversary year of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, has now joined the ranks of many earlier wargaming recreations of this famous battle. This treatment of Borodino, part of Columbia’s Great Battles of History series, is distinguished by a high degree of faithfulness to history. The game map, drawn from multiple 19th and 20th century Russian, English and French sources as well as personal exploration of the battlefield by this designer, reveals terrain and the Russian names in greater detail than most other games on Borodino. In addition, the order of battle, while presenting the armies on a division and corps scale, goes deeply into the latest research and historical sources on the Russian and French armies at Borodino. At the same time, Columbia’s game retains the relative simplicity of rules mechanics and the “fog of war” approach that have distinguished its earlier releases, while capturing the flavor of Napoleonic combat with squares, artillery bombardments, the famous redoubts at Borodino, and combined arms tactics. As a result, this great battle extending over two days can be recreated in a few hours of play.

Many gamers have shown interest in the history of the campaign and battle, and how it relates to the Borodino 1812 game. This article provides a “behind the scenes” look from the perspective of one of the designers. The map features, OB and game rules of Borodino 1812 were repeatedly compared to the actual battle history in the design process, to ensure that it was possible to recreate the historical actions of the commanders and that they made sense in game terms, while still allowing the players full scope to explore alternative strategies, some considered by the historical commanders but rejected.

Setting the Stage:

**Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia**

When Napoleon commenced his invasion of Russia on June 23-24, 1812 he had amassed the single largest army ever seen in Europe to that time along the Niemen River. 450,000 French
and allied troops invaded Russia at the outset, and with the part of the reserves later sent into Russia as well, about 500,000 troops under the Emperor’s command actually took part in the campaign. In the center, the main mass of the Grande Armée consisted of the Guard (Marshals Mortier and Lefebvre, both represented by Mortier in the game), I (Marshal Davout), II (Marshal Oudinot), III (Marshal Ney), IV (Army of Italy, headed by the Viceroy, Gen. Division Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s stepson), V Polish (Gen. Division Prince Poniatowski), VI Bavarian (Gen. Division St. Cyr), VII Saxon (Gen. Division Reynier), and VIII Westphalian (initially headed by Napoleon’s brother King Jerome and Gen. Division Vandamme) Corps and the four cavalry corps (I-IV) of Marshal Murat’s Reserve Cavalry. The Franco-Prussian X Corps (Marshal MacDonald) to the north and an Austrian auxiliary corps (Gen. Prince Schwarzenberg) to the south guarded the flanks. In reserve were the IX (Marshal Victor) and XI (Marshal Augerau) Corps, and other garrisons scattered throughout Poland and Germany, and of these forces, the entire IX Corps was sent into Russia in September, with various smaller units coming in as well. The 225,000 men in reserve, together with the initial invasion force, totaled 675,000 men available to Napoleon. These included 513,000 infantry and 98,000 cavalry, a total of over 611,000.

But, surprisingly, this massive array did not give Napoleon an overall numerical advantage over the Russians, for Tsar Alexander I could also draw on enormous forces throughout his vast dominions. The Russians had some 517-528,000 regular troops, plus 64,000 Cossacks and other irregular cavalry initially available and another 40,000 raised during the campaign, for a total of over 100,000 irregular light cavalry, and to these more than 600,000 troops the Russians could also add 223,000 militia of dubious combat value. Napoleon’s key initial advantage lay not in total numbers but, as so often in his other campaigns, in superior concentration.

The Russians had three armies deployed along their frontier, with the 1st Army under War Minister Gen. Barclay de Tolly the largest, numbering 127,800 – 136,000 men with I, II, III, IV, V Guard, and VI Corps, the I, II, and III Cavalry Corps and a Cossack cavalry corps. This force was positioned to cover Lithuania and the approaches to either St. Petersburg or Moscow. To its south was Gen. Prince Bagration’s 2nd Army, with 52,000 – 57,000 men and the VII and VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps, covering Byelorussia. And further south below the great obstacle of the Pripyet Marshes, protecting the Ukraine and separated from the other two front-line armies during most of the campaign, was Gen. Tormasov’s 3rd Army, with IX, X, and XI Corps and a cavalry corps in reserve, altogether 45,800 – 48,000 men.

This front line force of 225,600 – 241,000 was outnumbered at the outset two to one by the forces of Napoleon’s Grande Armée that initially crossed the border, as much of the Russian army was still on other fronts at the start of the campaign. The Army of the Danube/Moldavia, recently commanded by Gen. Kutuzov and replaced by Admiral Chichagov, faced Turkey with 50,000 -54,500 men, while the Finland Corps, with 28,500 -30,000 men, held this province captured from Sweden in 1809. The Crimea had a garrison of 19,500 men, and in the Caucasus the Georgian Corps deployed another 24-34,000, while behind the Russian lines in the center were 84,000 more men in the I and II Reserve Corps. Most of these 206,000 – 222,000 men would eventually join the Russian forces facing Napoleon, apart from those in the Caucasus, but the ones from other fronts would have to march great distances to do so and could not be used in the struggle against Napoleon for the first few months.

The French and Russian Armies: 1812

(Russian strength is total army at the outset of the campaign; French strength counts forces available for the Russian campaign in Poland and Germany, but not on other fronts like Spain)
Napoleon struck into Russia with the objective of bringing on a battle near the border, and dividing the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, seeking to isolate and destroy the smaller 2nd Army first. But those two Russian armies, following the strategy urged by Barclay in light of Napoleon’s numerical advantage in the center, fell back and refused to give battle. The more aggressive Bagration retreated reluctantly and only narrowly escaped the trap set for him, with Davout’s I Corps at one point getting ahead of the Russian 2nd Army in its advance. Napoleon blamed Jerome’s slowness for Bagration’s escape, and in a huff the King quit and returned to Westphalia.

Napoleon’s opening advantage in concentration now began to work against him, as the territory through which the Grande Armée was passing could not support its enormous numbers, and severe attrition afflicted the French and their allies during the opening months of the campaign. Also, as Napoleon advanced deeper into Russia, the broad front of the advance north of the Pripyet Marshes increasingly narrowed, resembling a rapier thrust deep into the Russian heartland. Napoleon was forced to detach three entire corps from the Grande Armée, the II, IV and VII, to cover the ever-lengthening flanks, and leave other detachments behind from the remaining corps as garrisons. The Russians, too, had to detach the strong I Corps (Lt. Gen. Wittgenstein) with I Cavalry Division from their 1st Army to cover the approaches to St. Petersburg, as the rest of 1st Army fell back toward Moscow.

At last the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies combined at Smolensk and sought to give battle for the city in mid-August. Though Napoleon’s advantage in the strength of the main armies had narrowed from the initial 2-1 to just 1.5-1, the 120,000 Russians were still heavily outnumbered by Napoleon’s remaining 180,000 and they were forced to abandon the city after significant losses by both sides. Following this defeat, the Tsar appointed the elderly Kutuzov, fresh from his successful conclusion of a peace with Turkey, to overall command of the combined 1st and 2nd Armies, though he kept both of the original army commanders in charge of their armies as well, creating an overly complex command structure. Kutuzov determined to fight again to try to save Moscow, and the place he chose was Borodino.

Attrition, battle losses at Smolensk and detachments had still further reduced Napoleon’s Grande Armée to 135,117 men, with the corps remaining – Guard, I, III, IV, V, VIII (now commanded by Gen. Division Junot), and the four in the Cavalry Reserve – down to an average of about 45% of the troops with which they had crossed the Russian border in June. Napoleon, realizing that a major battle was about to take place, halted his army at Gzhatsk on Sept. 2 and 3, and the muster there gives us an accurate total of the strength of each of the corps of the French army just before the battle, with about 123,000 present and another 12,000 due to return within 5 days, in time for the battle. Though it is not certain if all these detachments arrived, the largest of them, including most of IV Cavalry Corps (though one brigade was absent) and a division of II Cavalry Corps, are indeed known to have returned in time. And with some additional troops of the Young Guard not counted in those totals that likely reached the battle, and men attached to Napoleon’s AHQ, the total of 135,000 fairly represents what Napoleon had for Borodino.

Though the Russians had not suffered as heavily as Napoleon, the 180-193,000 that the two Russian armies had at the start had now been reduced to only a little over 100,000, plus

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12,500 militia brought along from Smolensk. By late August, the recorded strength of 1st Army was 65,598, with 432 guns, and of 2nd Army 34,923, with 173 guns, plus a few thousand more army-level HQ staffs and attached troops. 15,568 regular replacements brought by Gen. Miloradovich at the end of August, on the eve of the battle, helped to restore the depleted Russian formations, raising their strength in regulars to over 108,000 counting HQ troops, plus another 10,000 Cossack and other irregular cavalry. 10,073 of these reinforcements (9,535 infantry, 538 cavalry) went to 1st Army and 5,495 (5,053 infantry, 442 cavalry) to 2nd Army, so that 1st Army now reached a strength of about 77,100 and 2nd Army about 41,500. Gen. Barclay’s 1st Army, with nearly two-thirds of the regular and Cossack troops, included II (Lt. Gen. Baggovut), III (Lt. Gen. Tuchkov), IV (Lt. Gen. Osterman-Tolstoy), V Guards including the 1st Cuirassier Div. (Lt. Gen. Lavrov, temporarily in command in place of the Tsar’s brother Grand Duke Constantine who was absent in St. Petersburg), and VI (Gen. Dokhturov) Corps, and I, II, and III Cavalry Corps as well as the Cossack Corps (Gen. Platov, Ataman of the Don Cossacks). Gen. Bagration’s 2nd Army, with slightly over a third of the regulars and Cossacks, included VII (Lt. Gen. Rayevski) and VIII (Lt. Gen. Borodzin) Corps, as well as all of its cavalry under the command of Lt. Gen. Golitsyn, including IV Cavalry Corps, the 2nd Cuirassier Div. and several regiments of Cossacks. And the arrival of some 21,000 Moscow militia boosted the total Russian forces to about 150,000, finally giving the Russians a numerical advantage over Napoleon, even though more than 40,000 of those troops were irregulars, of lower combat value than the regulars of the Grande Armée.

Though the Russian records do not provide a single tally of the corps strength of the entire army as the French have for the muster at Gzhatsk, they do give details of the strength of each of the corps of 1st Army immediately before the battle (though these need to be adjusted for the merging of the Russian rearguard of Cossacks, Jaeger light infantry and a division of 3rd Corps back into their parent corps). But individual infantry division strengths immediately before the battle of Borodino are usually not available in either the French or Russian records, except for the French Guard divisions and the Russian VIII Corps, and must be estimated from the battalion and squadron strengths of the individual divisions and the overall strengths of their corps.

The French and Allied Army

The French Army of the 1812 campaign was a remarkably multiethnic force. Though the French were of course by far the largest national contingent, with so much of his army committed to the Spanish campaign, Napoleon could not match the entire Russian army in numbers relying on French troops alone. He had called on his allies throughout Europe to fill out the ranks of the Grande Armée. Against Russia also marched Poles, Italians, Germans from Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Westphalia and an array of minor states, Austrians, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Swiss, Illyrians, Dalmatians and Croats. Nothing like this had been seen in Europe before, since Xerxes marched all the peoples of the Persian Empire against Greece.

HQs (Leaders):

One significant advantage that the French enjoyed was their leaders’ overall superiority in military experience and talent. For many years, the French had been fighting and usually winning battles all across Europe. They drew their commanders not just from a narrow noble class but, thanks to the French Revolution, from a broader pool of talent in all of French society. Most of the French commanders, apart from the aristocratic Davout, came from relatively humble origins, unlike the leaders of the Ancien Regime armies they faced. The very presence of Napoleon exerted a demoralizing influence on his opponents, with his nearly unbroken record of success where he commanded in person, even if at Borodino he was not at his best. And other French corps commanders present at Borodino were likewise respected and feared by their foes. Davout,
Napoleon’s finest Marshal, and nearly the equal of the Emperor himself, had long demonstrated his ability to exercise independent command. Only he, along with Napoleon, has three steps in the game above the zero level, able to operate on his own for three hours without resupply. Napoleon and Davout also enjoy a command radius of three, able to command units from three areas away, reflecting their high administrative and tactical ability, which no other French leaders share. Murat, the King of Naples, was considered the finest cavalry commander in Europe and a formidable fighter in melee. Most other French leaders, including Ney, Eugene, Poniatowski and Mortier, if not in the same league as Napoleon or Davout, were nonetheless a match for almost any general the Russians could throw against them. Eugene and Poniatowski are good overall commanders in the game, and while Ney and Mortier have shorter command ranges of 1, reflecting their more limited grasp of an overall battle, Ney in particular is a fierce fighter in melee. The one weak link in Napoleon’s high command at Borodino was Junot, now considered half-mad, and only a year away from full madness and his death by jumping from a window. His single step above the zero level, reflecting the need for close supervision, seriously limits the potential of his Westphalian VIII Corps, a hard-luck force that Napoleon left behind on the battlefield of Borodino to dispose of corpses and tend to wounded while the rest of his army pressed on to Moscow after the victory. Significantly, unlike the Russians with their more regular corps structure, Napoleon was willing to vary the strengths of his corps considerably to reflect the abilities of their commanders. Thus, Davout commands by far the most powerful corps at Borodino, and Murat, Eugene and Mortier also have strong forces. By activating just these four corps in the game, the French player can put the large majority of his forces into combat, even while the weaker corps of Ney, Poniatowski and Junot are held back.

The HQ units in the game principally represent the value of the commanders, and their ability to inspire and rally troops, though the Napoleon AHQ had a significant escort of an infantry battalion and a cavalry regiment, plus some squadrons added from other cavalry regiments.

Infantry:

The French and their allies fielded in the Russian campaign 41 infantry divisions, including the Old, Middle and Young Guard, the Legion of the Vistula, the Italian Guard, and regular infantry divisions numbered from 1-34 (with no 29th), as well as 3 Austrian divisions. 18 of these infantry divisions, including four of the Guard (with the Young Guard mostly not present), and the 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 13th – 14th, 16th, 18th, and 23rd–25th, were present for Borodino.

The French and allied infantry was principally divided into line and light infantry regiments, and at Borodino there were a total of 65 infantry regiments, including 42 line and 6 light regiments in the regular infantry. The Guard divisions had a number of unique regimental designations of their own, and the 17 Guards regiments at Borodino included 3 grenadiers, 2 chasseurs, 2 tirailleurs, 3 voltigeurs, and 2 fusiliers, as well as 3 Polish Legion of the Vistula and 2 Italian Guard regiments. Various types of regiments were combined in the divisions, and the number of battalions in them could also vary, from as few as two to as many as five in Davout’s powerful divisions. A few regiments were even represented by just one of their battalions.

For the most part the light infantry remains combined with its parent divisions in the game. However, recognizing that the French often deployed screens of light voltigeurs to cover areas unprotected by other forces or to provide extra support for the regulars, there are three 1-step voltigeur units in the game, better able to engage and retreat quickly than regular infantry. The voltigeurs, like their Russian Jaeger counterparts, are “double-counted” in the game along with the light infantry in their parent divisions, since the voltigeur screens could be formed from any infantry divisions as needed.
There are 58 steps of French infantry in the game, apart from the 3 steps of voltigeur detachments. At 1600 men per step, these 58 steps represent 92,800 men, about 1 step more than the actual French infantry total of 90,507 reported on Sept. 2. The difference is mainly due to the addition of a step to the Middle Guard representing a 2000-man brigade of the Young Guard that had likely arrived by the time of the battle, but was not yet counted in the earlier totals.

Cavalry:

The French and their allies had a total of 24 cavalry divisions in the Russian campaign, including the elite cavalry division in the Guard, the mainly light cavalry divisions attached to each of the other infantry corps, and the total of 11 cavalry divisions in the four cavalry corps – 3 each in I, II, and III, and 2 in IV Cavalry Corps, numbered Heavy 1-7, and Light 1-4. 17 of these cavalry divisions including the Guard, the corps cavalry of I, III, IV, V, VI (attached to IV Corps, though the rest of the corps was absent), and VIII Corps, and 10 of the 11 divisions in the cavalry corps (all except 3rd Heavy) were also present for Borodino. In the game, the corps cavalry divisions are shown separately, but the 10 divisions forming the four cavalry corps are combined into their parent corps to show the full effect of the massed French cavalry; separately, they would mostly be 1 step and in no case more than 2 step units and would be considerably less effective than they were in real life, hardly capable of the feats they accomplished including battering their way into the Great Redoubt.

As in many of the other armies of Europe, the French and allied cavalry fielded a bewildering array of unit types, including the heavy cuirassiers and carabiniers, dragoons, hussars, lancers (or their German counterparts, uhlans), chasseurs (or their German counterparts, jaegers-zu-pferde), and light horse (chevaux-legers). The cuirassiers, carabiniers and dragoons are normally found in the Heavy divisions in the reserve cavalry, and the other types in the light and corps cavalry divisions. The elite Guards, in addition to several of these types, even had their own horse grenadiers. Each regiment usually had 4 squadrons, though sometimes only 2 or 3, or as many as 5 in the Guard. Napoleon’s cavalry at the time of Borodino, notwithstanding the heavy attrition already suffered, was still a very potent force, and after the disaster of the Russian winter Napoleon found these experienced troops and their mounts the hardest to replace. At Borodino, there were 6 regiments of cavalry in the French Guard (1 dragoon, 1 chasseur, 1 grenadier, 2 lancer, and 1 gendarmarie), as well as 19 chasseur and 2 jaeger-zu-pferde, 14 lancer, 11 hussar, 9 chevaux-leger, 6 dragoon (inc. 2 Italian Guard), 2 carabinier, and 15 cuirassier (including 1 Saxon gardes du corps) regiments, including some Italian and German guard cavalry regiments mixed with the regulars, a total of 84. As with the infantry, a few regiments had only one of their squadrons present.

There are 23 steps of French cavalry in the game, which at 1200 men per step represents 27,600 men, about one step less than the actual total of 29,219 reported on Sept. 2. The difference mainly reflects the handling of IV Cavalry Corps, the weakest of the four in cavalrymen. It was estimated to have 3200 cavalry for Sept. 2, but some sources indicate only about 2600 present for Borodino, giving it 2 rather than 3 steps. This also better fits the overall Reserve Cavalry strength (with 15,780 cavalry and 1905 artillerymen on Sept. 2, a total of 13 steps of cavalry, 11 of which are accounted for in I, II and III Cavalry Corps). Here, and also with the III Corps cavalry, the French cavalry has been rounded down in close cases to reflect the worse condition of their mounts by this point in the campaign compared with the Russians.

The remaining men in the army were in the artillery and train, totaling 15,391.
The following table shows the strengths of the French and allied corps at the outset of the Russian campaign, and the strength that each of the ones that fought at Borodino had available there as of Sept. 2 for the battle. The French corps that fought at Borodino, beginning with a total of 298,873 men and 682 guns, was reduced to a total of 135,117 men and 587 guns by the time of the battle, 45.2% of their starting manpower and 86.1% of their artillery.

- 6 guns were in a horse battery supporting the corps cavalry divisions of I and III Corps.

The infantry, cavalry, and artillery/train manpower in each of the French corps at Borodino, based on the Sept. 2 muster (with arrival of detachments), were as follows: (see 2nd table below)

Of the corps present at Borodino, the Guard, IV and V Corps, and III Cavalry Corps had the largest share of their forces missing at the time of the battle. Guard: The Hessian Guard Regiment had been left at Vilna and the Guard Flankers Regiment of the Middle Guard at Smolensk, 6 of the 12 battalions of the Polish Vistula Legion were detached, and of the Young Guard, at least a full brigade of three regiments was still en route from Smolensk, with no more than one brigade present at Borodino. That brigade, which would only be a 1 step unit by itself in game terms, has been combined with the Middle Guard Division.

I Corps: One regiment of the 4th Division, 33rd Light, had been left behind in Minsk and Smolensk, so that this division is weaker than the others in the corps. A few infantry battalions of regiments from minor German states were also left behind in garrisons, so that some German regiments attached to this corps are represented at Borodino by single battalions. The corps cavalry division of I Corps, which would only be a 1 step
unit in game terms by itself, has been combined with the corps cavalry of III Corps, so that I Corps is the only French corps that does not have its own corps cavalry division appearing in the game OB. Both of these cavalry divisions historically fought together at Borodino under Murat’s command and are sometimes mingled in French OB data.

III Corps: The corps cavalry division, which would only be a 1 step unit in game terms, has been reinforced with the still smaller cavalry division of I Corps to make them into a single 2 step unit. III Corps had three infantry divisions, but one of them, the 25th Wuerttemberg, had been so heavily reduced by this time that its several regiments had been turned into a single regiment of three provisional battalions, with only about 2000 men remaining; this unit, which would have only 1 step on its own, has been combined with the 10th Division, alongside which it fought during the battle. III Corps had also detached the Illyrian Regiment from 11th Division, and the 129th Regiment from 10th Division.

IV Corps: The Italian 15th Division (Pino) only arrived with its five regiments and divisional guns on the evening of Sept. 7, too late to fight. On the plus side, IV Corps had been able to borrow the Bavarian cavalry of the VI Corps, even though the infantry of that corps was detached in support of Oudinot, making the corps cavalry of IV Corps (Ornano) stronger than most of the others. The corps cavalry unit also includes the cavalry of the Italian Guard.

V Corps: The Polish 17th Division (Dombrowski), with four regiments and its divisional guns, was detached, busy pursuing partisans and protecting lines of communication, and another regiment from 16th Division had been left behind as well, as well as 4 cavalry squadrons, leaving the Polish corps weak with only two infantry divisions of three regiments each.

VIII Corps: Its two Westphalian infantry divisions, the 23rd and 24th, are combined in the game into one unit, since the 24th had only four battalions and no regiments by this point and by itself would have just one step; the two divisions fought alongside during the battle. This corps had left significant numbers of troops in garrisons behind its advance.

III Cavalry Corps: One of its cavalry divisions, the 3rd Heavy, was detached with 4 regiments, including 16 squadrons and 12 guns, to Oudinot’s II Corps, causing this cavalry corps to be missing a larger part of its starting strength than the others.

IV Cavalry Corps: This corps, which had one less cavalry division than the other three at the start, had also detached one brigade of 3 Polish regiments with 9-12 squadrons to support Dombrowski’s division chasing partisans, making it the weakest of the four in cavalry strength (though it had slightly more men than III Cavalry in the Sept. 2 totals due to its larger artillery contingent).

The Russian Army

The Russian Army of 1812 was a considerably more homogenous force than the Grande Armée, with all of its regular soldiers subjects of the Tsar and principally ethnic Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians, though there were some more exotic nationalities thrown into the mix from the borderlands of the Russian Empire. At the level of the officer corps, though, there was a significant contingent of foreigners, especially Germans, in the service of the Tsar, having left their own conquered homelands. Among these the most famous name is Clausewitz, at the time serving on the staff of the Russian I Cavalry Corps, giving him an opportunity to participate in the battle of Borodino. Many other high-ranking officers with non-Russian ancestry, including Barclay (Scottish), Bagrovut (Norwegian) and Bagration (a Georgian prince), actually came from lands under the rule of the Tsar but could still seem “foreign”; the Baltic provinces from which Barclay hailed were still culturally distinct, with their German-speaking nobility.

HQs (Leaders):

The Russian officer corps, drawn very heavily from the nobility, had a narrower pool of talent than the French, and was also often seen as less professional, notably by the Germans who came to Russia as advisers to the Tsar. Though the
average ability of the Russian commanders was not as high as the French, as reflected by their ratings in the game, nonetheless the Russians do have a number of reasonably able generals, and most of them, except Borozdin, had fought against Napoleon before. None of them enjoy the three steps of Napoleon or Davout, and only Barclay de Tolly shares their command radius of 3. Kutuzov, though the overall army commander and a competent general, was rather lethargic during the battle and took a less active role, while Barclay was always in the thick of the action, having several horses shot from under him. Barclay, the Russian War Minister, was rather unique in the Russian high command. He had, like many of the French, risen from a relatively humble station to the highest levels by his own merit, and through impressing the Tsar with his considerable administrative skills, thus exciting the jealousy of many other generals. Bagration is the fiercest fighting general on the Russian side, a match for Murat or Ney, and though he had never been wounded in battle before, he paid the price for his aggressiveness at Borodino when he fell in the fighting for the Fleches and Semyonovskoye. Most of the other Russian generals have at least the two steps needed to conduct a respectable defense, though their command ranges are usually short, only 1. Dokhturov and Platov are the exceptions with command ranges of 2, as full generals who showed their ability to command over wider areas (Dokhturov even replaced Bagration in command of 2nd Army). Some of the Russian generals, like Rayevski, Tuchkov, and Osterman-Tolstoi, are good fighters as they demonstrated at Borodino. The weak link on the Russian side is Lavrov, with only 1 step above zero; he normally commanded the Guards division but was temporarily filling in for Grand Duke Constantine, and during the battle was reported as being paralyzed under fire. Unfortunately for the Russians, he does not command a weak corps like Junot but the invaluable V Guard Corps, and historically Barclay and Kutuzov often stepped in directly to deploy his forces. As a result of the Russian command structure, with more and smaller corps reflecting the more limited abilities of generals, and the multiple army commands, the Russians are able to bring considerably less of their forces into action during any game turn than the French. This compels them to play a more defensive role and they are generally only able to counterattack on a single front. This was true in the historical battle as well.

As with the French, the main strength of the HQ units in the game derives from the abilities of the commanders themselves, but the Russians also had escort troops for the AHQs detached from the main army – 2 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry regiments and a Cossack regiment for Kutuzov’s and Barclay’s AHQs, and a Cossack regiment and a militia battalion for Bagration’s AHQ.

Infantry:

Of the 51 infantry divisions in the Russian Army in 1812, 30 were formed from the Guard and regular regiments of the army, and can be considered front-line formations in every sense. These were the Guard, 1st Grenadier, 2nd Grenadier, 3rd through 27th, 1st Combined Grenadier, and 2nd Combined Grenadier divisions. The Combined Grenadiers divisions were unique formations, without regiments of their own and taking their battalions from elite Grenadier companies of the other regular divisions; all of the other divisions at Borodino, apart from the Guards, contributed usually two and at least one battalion to the Combined Grenadiers. The Guard and four Grenadier divisions were all elite units, even though the Grenadiers were considered part of the regular army, and all were present for Borodino, along with the 3rd – 4th, 7th, 11th – 12th, 17th, 23rd – 24th, and 26th – 27th Divisions, with the other regular divisions in the other armies and corps elsewhere. The remaining 21 infantry divisions, 28th through 48th, were formed from reserve troops – depot battalions of regular regiments and garrisons – and were not usually as strong as the front-line formations. None of them were used at Borodino, though some saw action on secondary fronts. The Russian infantry corps typically had two infantry divisions each, though
the VIII Corps at Borodino had three.

The Russian regular infantry had 170 regiments, including 96 infantry regiments, 50 Jaeger light infantry regiments, 14 grenadier regiments, 6 Guard regiments (including 1 Guard Jaeger) and 4 marine regiments. All of the Guard, 12 of the Grenadier, 39 of the infantry and 19 of the Jaeger regiments were present for Borodino, a total of 66. The structure of the Russian infantry divisions was more consistent than in the French army, with a normal infantry division having four infantry and two Jaeger regiments of two battalions each, while the Grenadier divisions had six grenadier regiments of two battalions each, and the Guards infantry division had all six of the guards regiments, but at increased strength with three battalions each. The typical Russian regular infantry divisions all have 3 steps in the game, but two are weaker with 2 steps, the 23rd which was missing two of the normal six regiments, and the 3rd, which had been weakened during its rearguard role. Two Russian divisions are also stronger, the relatively fresh 27th at 4 steps, which had come from Moscow at the start of the campaign, and the powerful Guards with 6 step thanks to their extra battalions, with the greatest total firepower (steps x fire rating) of any unit in the game. Like the French, the Russians also occasionally deployed large screens of light infantry Jaeger regiments, reflected by the three Jaeger units in the game that can be commanded by any HQ, even though the Jaeger regiments are normally operating with their parent infantry divisions. These Jaeger detachments, as with the French voltigeurs, are “double-counted” with the Jaeger regiments in the infantry divisions since these screens could be formed from any infantry division with Jaegers in it.

In the game, there are 47 steps of Guard and regular infantry, excluding the 3 steps of “double-counted” Jaeger detachments. At 1600 men per step, the regular and Guard infantry total are 75,200, closely matching the actual Russian corps infantry strength of about 75,300 men.

The Russian militia (opolcheniye) at Borodino were from Moscow, formed into three divisions (1st-3rd) with 8 regiments of jaegers and infantry and 32 battalions, and from Smolensk, formed into 11 battalion-like “districts.” In the game, the three Moscow militia divisions, which were of widely differing strengths, have been merged into Moscow 1 and 2, given that it is not clear how many of the regiments of each division actually fought. These troops were motivated to defend their homeland, but ill-trained and ill-armed with a mixture of muskets and pikes. Of the 12,530 Smolensk militia available for Borodino, about 2000 were left nearby at Mozhaisk with 10,000 present on the field, while 20,748-21,694 Moscow militia were present with another several thousand en route. But given the equipment of these recently raised troops (many had just pikes), only about half of them, around 15,000, performed in a combat role at Borodino, with the rest in various noncombatant roles, helping to build redoubts, carry away wounded, etc. Those that fought were initially held in reserve along the Old Smolensk Road behind III Corps on Sept. 7th, but eventually were used to aid in the defense of the Utitskii Kurgan.

There are 9 steps of Russian militia infantry in the game, at 1600 men per step a total of 14,400, which reasonably corresponds to the half of the militia that actually were available to fight.

Cavalry:

The Russian army had fewer cavalry divisions than the French, largely because the masses of Cossacks were not formed into divisions. The 19 cavalry divisions included the Guard cavalry, 1st and 2nd Cuirassiers, and the 1st – 8th Divisions formed from regular cavalry regiments, as well as the 9th – 16th Divisions consisting of reserve squadrons. Unlike the French army, with multiple cavalry divisions in each cavalry corps, the Russians normally had just one cavalry division in each corps – at Borodino, I Cavalry Corps had most of the Guards cavalry division with the rest in 1st Cuirassiers, and II, III and IV Cavalry respectively had the 2nd-4th Divisions, each consisting of several regiments. But each
Russian infantry corps normally had a large regiment of regular cavalry attached as well, and before the battle of Borodino those attached regiments were removed and merged with the cavalry corps to beef them up for action, raising most of the cavalry corps from 2 steps in game terms to 3. Only the 2nd Cavalry Corps remained weaker, for while it was reinforced from the corps too it also had to give up two of its normal regiments to serve as AHQ escort.

The Russian regular cavalry had 66 regiments, including 6 Guards, 8 cuirassier, 36 dragoon, 11 hussar, and 5 uhlans (lancers). All of the Guards and cuirassier regiments were present for Borodino (four of the Guards regiments in 1st Cavalry Corps, and the two heavier Guards regiments in 1st Cuirassiers), along with 13 dragoon regiments, 6 hussar regiments and one of uhlans, a total of 34. The Russian cavalry regiments normally had four squadrons in the field, but the hussars and uhlans were double-strength with 8 squadrons.

In the game, there are 15 steps of Russian regular or Guards cavalry, which at 1200 men per step totals 18,000 men. This corresponds well to the actual Russian regular corps cavalry strength of about 17,500 men at Borodino (18,500 with attached artillery).

The most colorful element of the Russian army was its irregular cavalry, primarily Cossacks from the Don, Ukraine, Siberia and other areas, with other Asiatic nationalities thrown in – Bashkirs, Tatars, and Kalmucks. They were not formed into regular divisions, with their highest formations normally regiments and occasionally brigades, though for the 1812 campaign an entire Cossack Corps was formed under the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Platov. These horsemen were superb at scouting, skirmishing and raiding, readily able on their light mounts to traverse all terrain, but preferred to avoid close combat and avoided head-on attacks against organized infantry, making themselves scarce when artillery came into play. For Borodino, 24 of these Cossack regiments were present, out of the 83 Cossack and other irregular regiments that had been present with the Russian army at the start of the campaign (60 Don Cossacks, 14 other Cossacks, and 9 non-Cossack irregulars) and 67 later raised. The great majority of the Cossacks at Borodino were from the Don, a total of 16 regiments, as was true of the Cossacks overall, but there were also 3 Bug and 1 Teptyarsk Cossack regiments, as well as 1 Bashkir, 2 Tatar, and 1 Kalmuck regiments. The Cossacks typically had 5 “sotnias” (hundreds) in place of squadrons in each regiment, while one reinforced Ataman regiment had 7-10.

In the game, there are 9 steps of Cossack cavalry, which at 1200 men per step total 10,800 men, reasonably corresponding to the total number of about 10,000 Cossacks and other irregular cavalry in the field at Borodino. At least 5600 and likely between 6000-7000 of these were with Platov’s Cossack Corps (the 1 and 2 Cossacks units, with a combined total of 14 regiments), and 3016 with 2nd Army (the 3 Cossacks unit, with 8 regiments), while there were two more regiments of about 400 men each as AHQ escorts, one each with 1st and 2nd Army. Each of the three Cossack units in the game represents somewhat over 3000 men rounded up to 3 steps. The Cossack force has often been underestimated, in part because there is no contemporaneous separate total for all the Cossacks at Borodino in the Russian records -- parts of them are grouped with advanced guards or other detachments.

The remaining 16,000 men in the regular army are accounted for by the artillery and train, including HQ staff and escorts, pioneers and pontooniers. These men, together with the 75,200 infantry, 18,000 cavalry and 10,800 Cossacks in the steps represented in the game, bring the total for the Russian army other than the militia to 120,000, no more than 1400 above the actual overall strength of about 118,600 for the Russians (due to rounding off). With the combatant part of the militia, the Russians are about even in numbers with the French.

Though there is no single tally of manpower for the Russian forces at the time of Borodino, a good estimate of the actual Russian strength can be derived from the records of 1st Army and partial ones for 2nd Army.
As of Sept. 5, 1812, 1st Army recorded these corps strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions (excluding militia)</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons (including Cossacks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Cavalry</td>
<td>2434</td>
<td>25 (inc. 11 reg. inf. returned to III Corps, 6 Comb. Gren. to V Corps, 8 jaegers to VI Corps)</td>
<td>20 (+8 added from infantry corps before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd and 3rd Cavalry</td>
<td>3439</td>
<td>31 (+25 added from infantry corps before battle)</td>
<td>98 (inc. 26 Cossacks returned to 2nd Army before battle, rest of Cossacks, 72, with Platov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Guard</td>
<td>15,370</td>
<td>24 (inc. one Comb. Gren., other Comb. Gren. sent to AHQ)</td>
<td>6.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>11,452</td>
<td>12 (+11 added from Advanced Guard, + 1 sent to AHQ)</td>
<td>7.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>6,791</td>
<td>21 (inc. one Comb. Gren., other Comb. Gren. sent to AHQ)</td>
<td>5.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>10,468</td>
<td>22 (+6 Comb. Gren. added from Advanced Guard)</td>
<td>28 (20 retained, 8 transferred to cavalry before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Guards Corps</td>
<td>17,260</td>
<td>16 (+8 added from Advanced Guard)</td>
<td>6 (transferred to cavalry before battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Corps</td>
<td>8,465</td>
<td>120 (+2 at AHQ = 122)</td>
<td>202.5 (-26 returned to 2nd Army; + 13 sent to AHQ = 189.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75,542</td>
<td>(with about 2000 of these returned to 2nd Army from the Advanced Guard)</td>
<td>(Total: 120 (-26 returned to 2nd Army; + 13 sent to AHQ = 189.5))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The totals in this Sept. 5 tally do not count AHQ staffs, escort troops detached from corps (2 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry regiments with 4 squadrons each, and a Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons, added to the chart), and attached pioneer and pontoonier companies in 1st Army and Kutuzov's AHQs, accounting for some 3500 more men. Nor does this tally reflect the substantial reorganization that took place just before the battle (as shown in the parentheticals in the table). All of the attached cavalry were removed from the infantry corps and added to the cavalry corps, except the 20 squadrons of cavalry attached to the Guard in 1st Cuirassier Division, adding 33 squadrons to the cavalry corps. In addition, a large part of the corps artillery was taken away and aggregated in army reserves, and there was also some shifting of guns between 1st and 2nd Armies, with the 1st Army reserve getting the bulk of the horse artillery. The Advanced Guard, which had been covering the army's retreat along the New Smolensk Post Highway, was also recombined with its parent corps just before the battle after its task was complete. This force appears to have included (1) all of the 72 squadrons of Cossacks with Platov in 1st Army, (2) 26 squadrons of Cossacks returned to 2nd Army before the battle (out of 31 that had been borrowed from 2nd Army for the Advanced Guard, 5 of which stayed with 1st Army), (3) 11 battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division in III Corps (the 12th battalion was detached as an AHQ escort), (4) the four Jaeger regiments of VI Corps with 8 battalions, and (5) 6 battalions of Combined Grenadiers from the 1st Combined Grenadiers Division. The artillery strength of 1st Army was given as 432 guns, including 144 position guns (12 batteries), 212 light guns (18 batteries, one below full strength with 8 guns), and 76 horse guns (7 batteries, including the two in the Guard with only 8 guns each).
For 2nd Army, the composition of VIII Corps is known in detail for each division as of the start of the battle, and data for the other corps is available or can be estimated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Division</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions (excluding militia)</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons (including Cossacks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>12,500 est., inc. artillery</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Corps total</td>
<td>17,410, inc. artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 27th Division</td>
<td>6112 (excl. artillery)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2nd Grenadier Div.</td>
<td>5136 (excl. artillery)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2nd Comb.Gren. Div.</td>
<td>4912 (excl. artillery)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Artillery</td>
<td>1250 est. (1058 on 9/7, in 6 batteries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cuirassier Div.</td>
<td>2800 est.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Cavalry</td>
<td>4300 est., inc. artillery</td>
<td>32 (inc. 8 added from VII Corps before battle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>3016 (+400 est. at AHQ)</td>
<td>40 (includes 14 +26 others returned from 1st Army Advanced Guard, +5 at AHQ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,026 (40,426)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>92 (97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These totals include (in parentheticals) the AHQ escort in 2nd Army of one Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons (though not the militia battalion attached to AHQ). However, they do not reflect the AHQ staff, pioneers and pontoniers, which probably added another 1100 men to the total. The 2nd Army had the remainder of the 624 guns before the battle, including 5 position batteries (60 guns), 5 light batteries (60 guns), and 6 horse batteries (72 guns), a total of 192, with 2 heavy, 3 light and 1 horse batteries in VIII Corps. By comparison, in late August 2nd Army was known to have had 54 position guns (4.5 batteries), 72 light guns (6 batteries), and 48 horse guns (4 batteries). With the reorganization before the battle some of these guns were shifted around between the two armies, and 2nd Army ended up with only 186 guns and considerably fewer horse batteries.

The two armies together, with HQ escorts, fielded 181 infantry battalions of regulars and Guards, 164 cavalry squadrons of regulars and Guards, and 122 Cossack sotnias (squadron equivalents), with 53 batteries of artillery (+1 in reserve at Mozhaisk, not counted). The combined strength of the two armies apart from militia was about 118,600, including about 75,300 infantry, 17,500 cavalry (not counting artillery attached to the infantry and cavalry), 9,800 Cossack and other irregular cavalry (other than those in the artillery and HQs), 10,000 in the army-level artillery reserves and train, HQ staff and escorts, and 6000 artillery and train still with the corps.

The final organization of the two armies at the time of the battle is shown in the OB tables at the end, matching the individual units in the game to the names of the regiments, and numbers of battalions or squadrons and artillery batteries, included in them.

**The Role of Artillery at Borodino**

Players of Borodino 1812 have recognized the power of the artillery of the two armies in the game – and that is as it should be. Napoleon called Borodino the “most terrible” of all his battles, and September 7 saw the largest casualties of any single day in the Napoleonic Wars. It was largely the predominance of artillery at Borodino that caused
caused this, as the ratio of guns to men was one of the highest in any Napoleonic battle.

The French and Russians began the campaign with very large numbers of artillery, but not an unusual ratio of guns to men. Napoleon’s forces available for the campaign at the start massed a close to 1400 guns – various sources give 1372, 1393, or 1412. Compared with the 675,000 men Napoleon had available, this was about 485 men per gun, taking the middle of the range for the gun total. The Russians had even more guns available among all their scattered forces, a total of 1484 in 124 batteries, which compared with the 623,000 regulars and Cossacks available yields 418 men per gun. These ratios appear similar to other Napoleonic campaigns and battles. For example, in the 1815 Waterloo campaign, the three armies had 362,000 men and 894 guns together, a ratio of 405 men per gun.

But by the time of Borodino, though attrition, battle losses and detachments had dramatically reduced the strength of the French corps in the battle to an average of only 45% of the manpower they had at the start of the campaign, the French had done a much better job of preserving their artillery forces, and still had 86% of the guns with which those corps began the campaign – 587 out of the original 682. The Russian artillery force was also still largely intact, with 624 guns on the battlefield (and another 12 in reserve at Mozhaisk). The 285,000 men on the Borodino battlefield and 1211 guns result in a ratio of only 235 men per gun. And this artillery was intensely used as well – the French estimated that they fired about 60,000 artillery rounds, and the Russians, who used their artillery less efficiently, still managed about 40,000. In the other major battles of the Napoleonic Wars, the ratio of guns to men was typically much lower. At Austerlitz, with 158,400 men on both sides and 417 guns, there were 380 men per gun; at Jena-Auerstadt, with 247,760 men on both sides and 441 guns, there were 335 men per gun; and at Wagram, with 328,200 men on both sides and 1031 guns, there were 318 men per gun. Indeed, in some of the battles in Spain, the artillery played an extremely minor role compared with Borodino. At Talavera, with 110,579 men in the French, British and Spanish armies and 126-142 guns, the ratio of men to guns was between 715-806.

French Artillery:

On the French side at Borodino, the principal gun types were 12 pounders, 6 pounders (used by both foot and horse artillery), howitzers, and 3 or 4 pounder guns used for regimental infantry support (usually 2 per regiment where available at all, but 4 per regiment in Davout’s well-equipped I Corps). Apart from the 3-4 pounders, the artillery was organized in batteries at the divisional and corps reserve levels, usually with the heavier guns in corps reserves while the lighter foot and horse batteries were attached to the infantry divisions, with a battery each of foot and horse guns with each division. A French foot battery would typically have 6 cannon (either heavy 12 pounders or the lighter 6 pounders) and 2 howitzers, and a French horse battery 4 cannon (6 pounders) and 2 howitzers. Some of the French allies followed the French organization, while others differed in battery strengths. And just as the French corps varied considerably in size, so did their artillery contingents, all the way from the 147 guns Davout controlled in I Corps to the mere 30 Junot had in VIII Corps. In the game, however, all of this artillery is massed at the corps level, following the Napoleonic principle of massing of guns into grand batteries, to allow its full effect to be felt in battle. Indeed, Napoleon regularly made coordinated use of the guns of multiple corps to get the most powerful artillery effect – for example, in his bombardment of the Fleches redoubts, he employed guns from the Guard, I Corps and III Corps.

Given that almost all of the corps had mixed types of guns, the artillery units are also classified in the game according to the predominant types of guns in them, even though other types are also included. Heavy artillery units always contain some 12 pounders, generally 50% or more, but usually have some lighter guns too. These
units, in the game, are the least mobile, unable to move into a battle but only bombard from an adjoining area, or defend. Light artillery units are mainly light foot artillery but often have some horse guns, or regimental 3 or 4 pounders mixed in. They can move into battle, but, like heavy guns, not retreat from battles in the first round. Finally, the horse artillery units – which are either pure horse guns as in Murat’s cavalry, or at most have a smaller number of light foot guns mixed in as in IV Corps – are the most mobile, able both to move into a battle and to disengage easily in the first round.

With 587 guns, at 24 guns per step the French have 24 steps of artillery in the game, and the individual corps artillery strengths generally match the 24 guns per step standard as well. Only Davout’s I Corps artillery, at 5 steps, appears a step weaker than the 6 steps it would normally be expected to have with 147 guns. That is because of the large number of less effective regimental 3 pounders in I Corps’ artillery; taking a step from Davout’s light artillery brings the French overall total of artillery steps to what it should be and avoids overvaluing the power of the I Corps guns. The French have 7 heavy, 11 light, and 6 horse artillery steps in their total of 24, reasonably corresponding to the totals of gun types, though the French army had 39 foot and 36 horse batteries. Each French artillery step, with 24 guns, represents about 3 foot or 4 horse batteries. The French have about 2/3 of their horse artillery guns represented in horse artillery steps, with the rest mixed into light artillery units in the corps.

**Russian Artillery:**

In the Russian army, the artillery organization was more logical, reflecting the reforms undertaken by Barclay and others before the 1812 campaign to establish more systematic corps structures. The Russians had three standard types of batteries, each with 12 guns regardless of type. The horse batteries contained 8 6 pounders and 4 10 pounder “licorne” howitzers, while the two types of foot batteries, position and light, similarly contained 8 guns and 4 howitzers, but in the light batteries the gun types tracked the horse batteries, while the heavy position batteries contained 8 12 pounders and 4 20 pounder “licorne” howitzers. Each corps normally had two artillery brigades in support, one for each of the two divisions, and each containing three batteries (often one position and two light). The infantry corps could also have a horse artillery battery, and the cavalry corps also typically had a horse artillery battery attached. Only the Russian Guard was somewhat unusual in artillery support, with two position batteries, two light batteries, and also two horse batteries (with only 8 guns each), plus two 3 pounders in the Marine Guard Equipage battalion, a type that had otherwise been abolished from the Russian artillery.

Had the Russians stuck with this structure for the battle, each Russian infantry corps would have had 3 steps of artillery in support in the game, much as the Guard does. But just before the battle, the Russians decided on a major reorganization of their artillery, massing a large part of the guns at the army level to create artillery reserves directly under the command of Barclay and Bagration. Horse guns (except in the Guard) only remained at the corps level in support of cavalry units, with many going into the 1st Army reserve, and each of the infantry corps gave up in theory two-thirds of their foot batteries as well to the army reserves, even though some of them were reinforced again as battle neared or appear to have retained more of their guns in practice. This decision weakened the artillery of all of the corps apart from the Guard, leaving them in game terms with only one step of artillery (III, VII Corps) or at most two (II, IV, VI, VIII Corps). In return, Bagration ended up with 4 steps of artillery in game terms under his direct control, 3 light and 1 heavy (half the guns in his army, out of 8 steps, or 9 after adding III Corps), and Barclay similarly ended up with 7 steps of artillery in game terms under his control (3 light, 1 heavy and 3 horse), which, added to the 3 steps of Guard artillery that were in reserve with the entire Guard corps at the start, meant that more than half of the artillery of 1st Army was in reserve (10 out of 18 steps, counting Tuchkov’s III Corps with 1st Army at the start).
The artillery reserve concept, though attractive in theory as a way to match Napoleon’s massing of guns into grand batteries (and one the Russians have often used throughout history, as with their massive artillery reserve corps in World War II), did not work out so well here in practice.

Bagration – who in game terms is at least able to command both of his artillery units at full strength – was mortally wounded by midday, and with his AHQ out of action, Dokhturov’s CHQ had to take over responsibility for the 2nd Army reserve. And Barclay’s total army reserve, with the three artillery units and three cavalry corps, is far more than he can possibly command on any one turn in the game; even with Kutuzov’s help, two of the six units would be out of command and have to act as stragglers, if at all. It was not supposed to be that way. But Barclay’s commander of the 1st Army artillery reserve, the young Maj. Gen. Kutaisov, managed to get himself killed early in the battle on Sept. 7, acting entirely outside his proper role by enthusiastically leading a bayonet counterattack. His death is assumed and he is not depicted in the game as a result – could one imagine any sensible player using his artillery reserve commander that way? Due to his loss, the main Russian artillery reserve was not properly coordinated as the Russians had planned, and a number of batteries were not even brought into action.

With 624 guns, at 24 guns per step, the Russians have 26 steps of artillery in the game, exactly as they should. Each step of 24 guns equals two full-strength Russian batteries, and the Russians had 17 position batteries, 23 light batteries, and 13 horse batteries. The types of Russian artillery steps match the battery types almost exactly, with 9 heavy steps, 12 light steps and 5 horse steps. The lower total for horse artillery steps is due to the two 8-gun Guard horse artillery batteries being merged into the Guard artillery unit, which is classified as light on average since it also mixes light and heavy batteries.

The Field of Borodino and the Strategies of Napoleon and Kutuzov

The Borodino battlefield in 1812 was a region of well-settled countryside with numerous villages (some of which appear for the first time in any Borodino game on Columbia’s map, thanks to new historical research), lying just to the west of the Moskva River. Most are smaller villages, though three shown on the map were larger, including Borodino, Yelnya and Utitsa (as well as Uspenskoye just off the map to the east), heading toward the town of Mozhaisk and Moscow. Finally, the third main road enters at Gryaz to the north, and then heads west and southward, nearly joining with the Old Ruzskaya Road, heading toward the town of Ruza and then Moscow. This road is often overlooked in descriptions of the battle, but research has shown that it was important for the advance of the parallel column of Eugene’s IV Corps to the north of Napoleon’s main force. Each of these other two main roads has one supply point for either side at each end.

The Kolocha River, a tributary of the Moskva, runs from the west across the
battlefield, and then turns northward after passing Borodino village to join with the Moskva. Both rivers could form significant obstacles to movement, particularly with the Kolocha’s ravine near Borodino and the high banks on the eastern side of the Kolocha east of Borodino, but are fordable at several points, with a bridge also crossing the Kolocha on the New Smolensk Post Highway at Borodino.

On the southern edge of the battlefield, forests and swamps traversed by only one significant road, the Old Smolensk Road, made it difficult though not impossible to flank the Russian position. The most vulnerable points were in the clear areas just south of the Kolocha, and there the Russians improved their position with several redoubts—the hilltop Shevardino Redoubt furthest to the west, and closer together and able to support each other, the three arrow-shaped Fleches redoubts as well as the hilltop Great Redoubt, protecting the Russian left and center. Behind these redoubts lay the Semyonovskaya Heights, affording the Russians an elevated position for artillery supporting their defense and for counterattacking reserves. On the Gorki hill that Kutuzov chose for his headquarters, with a good view of the battlefield, a smaller redoubt-like artillery position was also built, and furthest to the east, between the Moskva river and the Maslovskii Forest, the Russians built another complex of three redoubts near the village of Maslovo. This last, seemingly isolated position behind the Russian lines offers a key insight to how Kutuzov expected to fight the battle. He initially anticipated that Napoleon would try to cross the Kolocha river near to its confluence with the Moskva, and sweep along the west bank of the Moskva to cut the Russians off from their supply sources, forcing them away from Moscow. At the outset, Kutuzov did not foresee any significant French attack along the Old Smolensk Road, and did not deploy any regular troops that far south until after the opening battle on Sept. 5.

Napoleon was happy to encourage this misperception. His armies, advancing in three columns, were well positioned to attack on either the northern or southern flank, or in the center, with an effort in any direction able to be reinforced from the main body on the New Smolensk Post Highway. Napoleon rejected making his main effort in the north, which would require him to force the Kolocha against the strong opposition of 1st Army, but he kept Eugene’s IV Corps deployed in the north to focus Russian attention there, and even reinforced it on Sept. 7 with two of Davout’s five infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd (in the game, players can decide whether to reassign those two divisions to strengthen the northern flank, or keep Davout’s powerful I Corps intact). Eugene would use these borrowed divisions to the fullest, risking them more than his own troops.

Davout proposed a major flanking effort to the south, on or below the Old Smolensk Road, with both the I Corps and the Polish V Corps, which would have had to negotiate some difficult terrain but held out the prospect of cutting the Russians off from two of their main supply roads leading to the town of Mozhaisk, and trapping them against the Moskva. But Napoleon rejected this alternative, which would have put part of his army well out of reach of support from the rest.

The Emperor chose instead to concentrate his main effort against the Russian 2nd Army on the center-left, first clearing the Shevardino Redoubt to link up his army, and then driving with the main remaining force of I Corps, III Corps, part of IV Corps, and the Cavalry Reserve against the Fleches and the Great Redoubt. He aimed to crush 2nd Army before Kutuzov realized what Napoleon was about, and could reinforce 2nd Army by redeploying the corps of 1st Army. VIII Corps, initially planned as a reserve for III Corps in the center, was eventually shifted southward to reinforce the Poles, while the Guard formed the ultimate reserve, to be used, apart from its artillery, only if essential. With this decision to make a frontal assault, relying on the artillery, cavalry and tactical skill of the French commanders to prevail, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest of Napoleon’s battles.
Columbia Games’ *Borodino 1812*: The Game As History

(Continued)

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<th>The Armies at Borodino Compared</th>
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<td>Formations</td>
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**French and Russian Steps and Firepower in Borodino 1812**

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<tr>
<th>Unit Types</th>
<th>French Steps</th>
<th>Russian Steps</th>
<th>French Firepower</th>
<th>Russian Firepower</th>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59 (inc. 9 mil.)</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24 (inc. 9 Coss.)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>HQs (Leaders)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>275</td>
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The French advantage comes from concentration of their corps and superior leadership, allowing more troops to be commanded by fewer leaders. If the French and Russians both use four supply points to activate their four strongest corps – Guard, I, IV and Cavalry Reserve plus voltigeurs for the French, and V Guard, VIII, 2nd Army Cavalry, and either II or VI plus militia and Jaegers for the Russians – the French are able to bring 74% of their steps and 76% of their firepower into action, while the Russians can only bring 47% of their steps and 49% of their firepower into action. The difference between being able to deploy three-quarters of the French strength, and slightly under half of the Russian strength, for the same amount of supply, is what makes the strong offensive possible that the French need to win. But both armies can throw their entire strength into action if necessary during a turn, by draining their reserves of supplies in the game, so a powerful Russian counterattack at a critical juncture is still possible, and the French can never be entirely secure. If the Russian bear seems rather slow and sleepy much of the time, he can be formidable if roused.

While the total number of French steps in the game, at 125, is slightly less than the Russian total of 132, the French have the edge in firepower (steps x fire ratings of units), though the overall difference is less than 10%. This French firepower edge is due to the Russians having a large share of their steps, 18 overall, in irregular militia infantry and Cossack cavalry units with fire ratings of only 1, while all the French non-HQ units have at least 2 as regulars. The two armies are nearly equal in number of elite unit steps rated 3s or 4s (Guards, grenadiers and heavy cavalry, though not non-Guards heavy artillery), at 27 for the French and 28 for the Russians, and here firepower is comparable as well, at 89 for the French and 86 for the Russians. The Russian and French artillery are also close in steps and firepower, and indeed this is one area where the Russians even have the firepower edge, taking all gun types into account. With the advantage of the defense and terrain obstacles, this slight French edge in firepower would be readily offset, were it not for the ability of the French to bring considerably more of their firepower into action each turn for the same expenditure of supplies.
September 5:  The Opening Engagement at Shevardino  
Turn by Turn

This shorter scenario presents challenges for both players, whether played on a standalone basis or as part of a longer campaign game with the main battle. The French player must decide where to commit his reserves, as he can bring in I Corps and the Guard on any of the three entry roads. This choice can critically affect how the battle unfolds, particularly whether the French player reinforces the Poles at Yelnya or commits everything to the main thrust on the New Smolensk Post Highway. The French have limited time to achieve their victory objectives, only 7 hours (turns) before darkness, and must act quickly, while at the same time trying to minimize their own unit losses. In the standalone scenario, since the Russians will usually be able to hold four of the five redoubts, the French must try to at least capture Shevardino, both for the points and to link up the rest of their army with the isolated Polish V Corps coming in on the Old Smolensk Road, and kill three or more Russian units while losing none of their own – or kill even more Russians if the French suffer losses too. The Russians must decide whether to play this scenario essentially as a delaying action, expecting to lose Shevardino in the end but trying to minimize their own losses for the win, or to make a larger commitment of forces and use up more valuable supply, trying to kill French units in the north or south before Napoleon’s army is fully assembled. In the campaign game, both sides will be playing more for position than points on the first day, but need to be concerned not only about unit losses but about step losses too, taking care not to weaken themselves too much before the main battle on Sept. 7.

Historically, the Russians committed only a small part of their forces, including VIII Corps and the cavalry of 2nd Army, as well as some artillery and jaegers, and most of the fighting was limited to the Shevardino redoubt area. Since Kutuzov was focused on the threat of a French attack across the Kolocha River east of Borodino, as was evident from his opening deployment, Napoleon encouraged this delusion by keeping Eugene’s IV Corps and the Guard north of the Kolocha. As a result, the Russian 1st Army and even some parts of the 2nd Army, such as VII Corps, stayed largely immobile on September 5, while Napoleon concentrated Davout’s powerful I Corps, Poniatowski’s Polish V Corps, and the two strong cavalry corps of Murat’s Cavalry Reserve that had arrived on the 5th, I Cavalry (1CC ) and II Cavalry (2CC), against the Russians defending Shevardino. In the game, it is possible for the Russians to commit more units to the battle, but the corps leaders of 1st Army all start below their full strength to reflect the Russians’ uncertainty about which way Napoleon intended to move (strategic fog of war) and Kutuzov’s resulting unwillingness to bring his army fully into action. Kutuzov consciously preferred to give the initiative to Napoleon and react to what the Emperor did, having bitter experience with the danger of attacking Napoleon from Austerlitz. And in the game, this conservative approach to the battle leaves the Russians more supplies to build up their 1st Army CHQs for the main battle to come.

At the outset, all of the Russian army is deployed on the map, with set locations for HQs but some limited flexibility for individual units. The Russian rearguard of Platov’s Cossacks, the 3rd Division (Konovnitsyn), and screening jaegers, which had also been aided by I Cavalry Corps (Uvarov), has just rejoined the main army and taken up positions. Napoleon’s Grande Armée is approaching from the west in three parallel columns. The northern flanking column, coming through Gryaz, consists of Eugene’s IV Corps, with some screening voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowski’s V Corps, again with some voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowski’s V Corps, again with some voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowski’s V Corps, again with some voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowski’s V Corps, again with some voltigeurs.
rate of one corps per turn each on
the second and third turns, but
could be diverted to either of the
other entry roads.

2 pm – Napoleon, Eugene, and Murat are all active on the French side, while the Russians activate Golitsyn, Platov and Borodzin. The initial French forces advance, Napoleon and the French cavalry under Murat moving up toward Valuyevo where he establishes his HQ for Sept. 5, while Eugene moves toward the Voina stream where he has been directed to take up positions and threaten the Russian left flank. The Russians have established a screen of jaegers along the Kolocha River in front of Shevardino, a total of three regiments north of the redoubt around Fomkino and another three south of the redoubt facing the Poles, while behind this screen is the 27th Division (Neverovsky) shielding the redoubt, with artillery. This is enough to deter the French from crossing the Kolocha on the first hour of their entry; they will have to wait and prepare to attack. Three Russian batteries with 36 guns are positioned in and around the redoubt. The Russian IV Cavalry Corps (Sievers) moves up to protect the Shevardino redoubt to the west, but other divisions of the VIII Corps, including the 2nd Grenadiers (Mecklenburg) and 2nd Combined Grenadiers (Vorontsov), for the time remain in reserve behind the redoubt, along with the 2nd Cuirassiers (Duka). The Russian Cossacks of 2nd Army (Karpov) move southward to oppose the Poles, and some of the Russian militia (within Golitsyn’s command range) also move forward to Utitsa to cover the Old Smolensk Road, while Platov moves forward in the north, preparing his forces to meet Eugene and cover the Russian line north of Borodino.

3 pm – Eugene, Davout, Murat and Poniatowski are all active on the French side, while the Russians again activate Golitsyn and Borodzin. Eugene’s 13th (Delzons) and 14th (Broussier) Divisions advance to the western bank of the Voina, flanked to the north by the IV Corps cavalry division (Ornano). Davout’s I Corps enters along the New Smolensk Post Highway. The powerful 5th Division (Compans) advances toward Fomkino, where one of the two French cavalry corps, I Cavalry Corps (Nansouty) and II Cavalry Corps (Montbrun), forces a crossing, driving back the screening Russian forces, with the other remaining north of the river at Valuyevo for now (only one French cavalry can cross the dam to Fomkino as there is also an uphill slope here, but bombardment by some of Davout’s guns from the entry area across the Kolocha can help convince the Russians to fall back). The other divisions of I Corps move further down the New Smolensk Post Highway. The 3rd Division (Gerard) likely does not move south of the Kolocha during the battle on the 5th, remaining in support of Eugene west of Borodino, though also available as a reserve supporting the other divisions of the corps (with Davout’s command radius of 3 it is possible to keep these widely separated divisions under common control, even before the 1st and 3rd Divisions come under Eugene’s direct control for Sept. 7). But the other two strong divisions, 1st (Morand) and 2nd (Friant), plan to force a river crossing, while the weaker 4th (Dessaix) remains in reserve behind them and does not get involved in the fighting. Polish cavalry encounters the Cossacks near Yelnya, but the Cossacks fall back, covering Utitsa.

4 pm – On the French side, Davout, Murat, Poniatowski, Eugene and Mortier are all active, though after moving forward to join Napoleon Mortier does little, while the Russians activate Golitsyn, Borodzin and Bagration, bringing the AHQ forward to aid in the battle. The French 5th Division moves into Fomkino, while the French cavalry moves to its flank, taking the area on the southern bank of the Kolocha below Valuyevo. There is some skirmishing between Eugene’s forces and Russian Cossacks, jaegers and artillery defending the area of Borodino, but this appears to be more of a demonstration on the part of the French to draw the Russians’ attention here. The French are driven back from an attack toward Borodino by strong Russian forces including Uvarov’s I Cavalry Corps (1CC), jaegers and horse artillery, even though they do succeed in
crossing the Voina at Bezzubovo and drive back Platov’s Cossacks to threaten Borodino from the north. After this, there is little action in the north on Sept. 5 as the French do not press the attack. French Guard reinforcements begin arriving on the New Smolensk Post Highway, but they only move up to the Valuyevo area, held in reserve protecting Napoleon on Sept. 5, and are not committed to the battle. The Poles advance through the swamps and forests to the south of Shevardino with their 16th Division (Krasinski) and voltigeurs toward the redoubt, while the 18th Division (Kniaziewicz) and corps cavalry protect the Old Smolensk Road against the Cossacks. The Poles withstand a cavalry counterattack by regiments of the Russian IV Cavalry Corps.

5 pm – The French activate Davout, Poniatowski, and Eugene (who is reorganizing the French troops in the north) while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Bagration (who is bringing more artillery from the reserve into position). The French 5th Division moves into Doronino, forcing back Russian defenders and withstanding a Russian cavalry counterattack by IV Cavalry Corps with its troops forming square. French artillery of I Corps is brought into position to bombard the Shevardino redoubt from adjoining areas including Doronino. Meanwhile, the French 1st and 2nd Divisions force another crossing of the Kolocha at Alexsinki. The Poles push back screening Russian jaegers in the south, linking up with the main Grande Armée.

5 pm turn: Doronino Area

French (attacking): 5th Infantry Division (6) (coming from Fomkino area), I Corps Light Artillery (3) (coming from Fomkino area), Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (coming from Kudinovo Swamp area), Voltigeur B2 (1) (coming from Malvinka Swamp area).

Russian (defending): 4CC Cavalry Corps (3), Jager B2 (1).

Result: Russians retreat (they are conducting a delaying action here and do not attempt to put up a strong fight against the much more powerful French attackers, minimizing losses), with the French and Poles finally linking up.
6 pm – On the French side, Murat and Davout are both activated, while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Borodzin. The French 5th Division and some of Murat’s supporting cavalry, in II Cavalry Corps, attack the Shevardino redoubt following a bombardment, and the French infantry spearheading the attack force their way into the redoubt in fierce fighting with the Russian 27th Division and artillery, even though these are reinforced by the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Cuirassiers. The Russians wield their bayonets to good effect against the attacking French. The Russian defenders, though forced back, manage to save most of their guns. The French I Cavalry Corps has moved around the Shevardino Redoubt to the south in support of the Poles.

6 pm turn: Shevardino Redoubt Area

French (attacking): 5th Infantry Division (6) (coming from Doronino area), 2CC Cavalry Corps (4) (coming from area to north of Shevardino redoubt), and Horse Artillery 1 (2) (coming from area to north of Shevardino redoubt; attack is supported by bombardment using Davout's I Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (from Fomkino area) and Light Artillery (3) from Doronino area

Russians (defending): 27th Infantry Division (4, but reduced to 3 by artillery bombardment), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2), reinforced by 2nd Grenadier Division (3), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2)

Result: Russians retreat by 3rd round, with step losses to Russian
7 pm – The Russians activate all three of their leaders on hand, Bagration, Borodzin, and Golitsyn, while the French have Davout, Murat and Poniatowski all active. The Russians, seizing the initiative for once, attempt a major combined arms counterattack on the Shevardino Redoubt, with the elite infantry of the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Combined Grenadiers and the heavy cavalry of the 2nd Cuirassiers supported by a strong artillery bombardment. The 2nd Cuirassiers inflict serious damage on the French 5th Division, overrunning one of its regiments before it can form square. But the counterattack is finally repulsed, with losses to the Russians as well. In support of the French defending the Shevardino redoubt, the French infantry from Alexsinki, the 1st and 2nd Divisions, force their way into Shevardino village, forcing back the Russian IV Cavalry Corps and protecting the flank of the French position. The Poles have reached the foot of the Kamenka Hill south of the Shevardino redoubt, threatening the flank of the Russian position.

Shevardino Redoubt Area

Russians (attacking): 2nd Grenadier Division (3) (coming from area SE of redoubt), 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (3) (coming from Shevardino village area), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2) (coming from area SE of redoubt); attack is supported by bombardment involving VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2) from Shevardino village area, and II Army Light Artillery (3) from area SE of redoubt

French (defending): 5th Infantry Division (6, but reduced to 4 by artillery bombardment), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (3), Horse Artillery 1 (2), reinforced by I Corps Light Artillery (3)

Result: Russian counterattack repulsed, Russians retreat but with step losses on both sides to Russian 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions, and French 5th Infantry Division

Shevardino Village Area

French (attacking): 1st Infantry Division (4), 2nd Infantry Division (5)

Russians (defending): 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (because the Russians had the initiative this turn, their heavy artillery in the Shevardino village area was able to bombard and their 2nd Combined Grenadier Division to move from the Shevardino village area before the French moved in to attack, but the French were able to take advantage of the weakening of the Russian position in Shevardino village to attack in response)

Result: Russians retreat by 2nd round, with step losses to Russian 4CC Cavalry Corps and French 2nd Infantry Division; the Russians cannot use the Shevardino village area to retreat from the battle in the Shevardino redoubt as a result of the French attack but can still retreat their forces in that battle into the other area they attacked from SE of the redoubt
Where are the rest of the armies while these actions are going on? On the Russian side, the corps of 1 Army are largely inactive, though with some skirmishing around Borodino against Eugene's IV Corps in the French army, with the B3 Jager unit supported by the Russian 1CC Cavalry Corps (which pulls back late on Sept. 5) and Platov's Cossacks (which redeploy to the rear after Sept. 5) defending Borodino and Bezzubovo. Eugene's forces, supported by most of the French Voltigeurs, are largely making a demonstration to keep the attention of the Russians on this flank, rather than pressing an attack with all their strength, though they do clear the Russians out of Bezzubovo. Golitsyn's 3 Cossacks with some militia are screening Utitsa against part of the Polish V Corps (18th Division and artillery), with no serious fighting on the southern flank this day. The two Jager B2 units supporting II Army on Sept. 5 are screening the flanks of that army, one to the south of the Shevardino redoubt, being gradually forced back by the French 1CC Cavalry Corps and the part of the Poles that has moved north from Yelnya (though buying the Russians time and space to retreat their forces from the Shevardino redoubt battles), while the other Jager unit is on the northern flank, having been driven back gradually from Fomkino to Alexsinki and then into the woods west of the Great Redoubt. Though most of Davout's corps is engaged, the 3rd Division remains north of the Kolocha in support of Eugene, and the weaker 4th Division remains in reserve behind the advancing French. The French Guard, which came in after the other French forces, has remained in reserve with Napoleon around Valuyevo and does not move forward toward the Shevardino redoubt until after Davout has secured it and the Russians start withdrawing around 8 pm. This powerful force also serves to keep the Russians guessing about the possible direction of the French attack, maintaining the threat of reinforcing Eugene in the north.

Before Sept. 7 the French are able to repair the damage to their cavalry and some of the damage to their infantry, though the 5th Infantry Division remains a step below full strength at 4. The Russians have used the 8 pm turn to pull back behind the Sept. 7 start line, with the shot-up 27th Infantry and VIII Corps Heavy Artillery taking up their positions in the Fleches; the Russians have also been able to repair some of their damage, but the 27th Infantry remains a step below full strength at 3, and the 2nd Grenadiers also a step below full strength at 2.

I've given considerable attention to the positions and losses on Sept. 5 because it's important to ensure that the French and Russians are able to be in their Sept. 7 starting positions (the Russians need to be able to withdraw in time and also redeploy two corps, while the French need to be able to move up to Shevardino with Napoleon, be in position on both sides of the river to build the French Bridge, and be able to deploy their incoming Sept. 6 reinforcements), and to account for the damage on certain units that they have not been able to repair even with the end-game Sept. 5 and doubled Sept. 6 supply before the Sept. 7 battle begins. This will be less important at the end of Sept. 7 as there is no continuation of the battle; all that matters then are the losses both sides have suffered and the point count. Note that neither side has suffered any unit losses on Sept. 5, since the Russians have for the most part just conducted a delaying action and the French have also avoided an all-out commitment of their available strength in the north, so the only points are for redoubt control; if this were played as the stand-alone Sept. 5 scenario, the Russians would win with 4 points for 4 redoubts held to 2 French points for the Shevardino redoubt.

8 pm – The fighting dies down for the evening as darkness begins to fall. The Russians activate Bagration, Borozdin, Golitsyn, and Barclay (to pull back Uvarov’s I Cavalry Corps and the supporting horse artillery, leaving just the jaegers in Borodino) while the French activate Napoleon, Davout, Mortier, Murat, Poniatowski, and Eugene. The Russians, recognizing that it is no longer possible to retake the Shevardino redoubt, take advantage of the Columbia Games’ Borodino 1812: The Game As History (Continued)
initiative to pull their forces back toward the Fleches, across the “start line” on the game map (positioning their HQs in what becomes their starting positions for Sept. 7, though in the campaign game the HQs need not end up in the same place on Sept. 7 as they are assigned in the stand-alone scenario, since their starting positions for the next day of battle will depend on where they have ended up on Sept. 5). The French decline to press the attack further, but reorganize and consolidate their own positions (corresponding to the starting positions for the HQs for Sept. 7, though again in the campaign game the French HQs could end up in different positions for that day), bringing Napoleon, Mortier and the French Guard up from Valuyevo to the area of the captured Shevardino Redoubt.

Historically, the French lost about 4,000-5,000 men in the fighting on Sept. 5, and the Russians about 6,000, while each side lost about three guns. The most serious losses from the day’s fighting were to the French 5th Division, which had borne the brunt of the battle throughout the day, and to the Russian 2nd Combined Grenadiers and the 27th Division, both heavily engaged in the fighting for the redoubt. Rallying and resupply after the day’s fighting are insufficient to restore these three units, all of which start the battle on the 7th at a step below strength (for the 5th Division, this is a double-strength step so that the unit actually starts 2 below its full strength). Based on activations of leaders, the French expended at least 26 steps of supply in game terms, while the Russians used at least 19. Since both sides receive 21 during the Sept. 5 scenario (3 each for the 7 turns), plus 8 more after the battle if continuing to Sept. 7, assuming that they kept the activated leaders up to strength by the end of the scenario, this leaves the Russians with a surplus of 10, though they need to use 6 of those to bring the 6 CHQs of 1st Army up to full strength if continuing to Sept. 7, leaving 4 to provide replacements for damaged units. The French surplus is less, with only 3 remaining to provide replacements for damaged units, as the French have borne the burden of advancing into position and of attacking, and needed to activate leaders more frequently. In light of this, it is not surprising that both sides are not able to restore all of the historically damaged units in the game. But some losses are able to be restored, and all of the HQs brought up to their full strength for the battle on Sept. 7.

Neither the French nor the Russians have actually had any units “shattered”, so the only gains for the French this day, in victory points, are for the Shevardino Redoubt itself. The Russians historically saw the battle on the 5th as a failure, having been forced out of their position with losses. But in terms of the stand-alone Shevardino scenario, the day’s battle is a win for the Russians, who still have more redoubt points, with their main position intact, even though the French have secured a good position for beginning the next stage of the battle. The absence of “kills” of Russian units means that the French have missed a chance to weaken the Russians seriously before the main battle. Napoleon is said to have been astonished that no Russian prisoners were taken on the 5th, a foretaste of the sturdy resistance he would face two days later.

Between Sept. 5 and 7, there is a “quiet day” on Sept. 6 while Napoleon was waiting for the rest of his army to assemble, and the Russians were reorganizing and preparing for the main battle. If the French control the areas on the map on both ends of the “French Bridge” (actually a group of several small bridges the French built here), as they did historically, this bridge is now considered built and aids in maneuver across the Kolocha ravine during the Sept. 7 battle. The French should aim to be in a position at the end of Sept. 5 to build it if possible.

Napoleon historically received Ney’s III Corps and Junot’s Westphalian VIII Corps, coming in behind the rest of the army on the New Smolensk Post Highway. These troops are deployed in the game in range of their CHQs, which must in turn be deployed within command range of Napoleon, so where the French player locates Napoleon at the end of Sept. 5 critically affects his deployment for Sept. 7. Historically, Napoleon shifted the location of his HQ and the Guard from Valuyevo, where he had been during the fighting on Sept. 5, to the captured
Shevardino Redoubt before the battle began on Sept. 7 (though in game terms, that would need to be done by the last turn on Sept. 5 to get Napoleon in position in the center, as shown above). Murat’s two remaining cavalry corps, III Cavalry Corps (3CC)(Grouchy) and IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) (Latour-Maubourg), and the remaining half of Murat’s horse artillery, also arrive on Sept. 6 and deploy within range of the Murat CHQ. Grouchy’s 3CC had been operating in support of Eugene earlier, but did not make an appearance in the action on Sept. 5, and 4CC, which had been detached, was the last of Napoleon’s principal formations to arrive in time for the battle, turning up late on Sept. 6.

Though the Russians get no reinforcement units, they do have the opportunity to redeploy two of their corps before the battle on Sept. 7. Historically, the redeployed corps were Tuchkov’s III Corps, which was shifted from the center of the battlefield to the far south at Utitsa, and Platov’s Cossack Cavalry Corps, which was pulled back from its exposed front line position in the north facing Eugene’s IV Corps into the Russian cavalry reserve behind the Maslovo redoubts. Since the Russian III Corps gets switched automatically from 1st Army to 2nd Army in the game between Sept. 5 and 7, it almost always makes sense to have that corps be one of the two that redeploy, to get it nearer to the Bagration AHQ, unless the Russian player has already moved it there during Sept. 5. Alternatively, redeploys can be used to pull Russian corps back from exposed positions where they have been left at the end of Sept. 5, before the Sept. 7 fighting begins. The redeployments need to be to a friendly area, which requires occupation by a Russian unit; for example, the redeployment of Tuchkov’s III Corps from the center around Gorki to Utitsa in the south would require the Russian player to plan ahead by occupying Utitsa before the end of Sept. 5. This can easily be done by moving up a militia unit along the Old Smolensk Road from the Utitskii Kurgan, under command of any nearby corps leader or as a straggler, or sending the Cossacks 3 unit or jaegers there, which helps also on Sept. 5 to deter any French flanking movement by the Poles in the south. The historical redeployment of Platov’s Cossacks to the rear in the center is a less obvious move for the Russians, but does give them the flexibility to move north or south as needed, and to cover Russian supply sources and lines of retreat from their reserve position. One of the units in Barclay’s 1st Army reserve, with his long command range of 3, can be positioned at the start of Sept. 5 to be in that area and enable the redeployment, even if 1st Army does not move otherwise.

#### September 7: The Main Battle Turn by Turn

**6 am** – On the French side, Napoleon, Eugene, Davout, and Poniatowski are all active, while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Borozdin, as well as Bagration to maneuver the 2nd Army’s reserve artillery. The Russians are still waiting to see the direction of the French attack and conserving their supplies. Napoleon orders the use of over 100 guns for the bombardment of the Fleches, drawn from I and III Corps and the Guard. The French begin to fire on the Fleches with their massed batteries in front of Shevardino, but most of their artillery has to be moved forward as it was originally positioned out of range of the Fleches during the night. In game terms, only one of the French artillery units can initially fire directly across the Kamenka stream in front of the Fleches, while the other artillery needs to cross the start line and deploy into the wooded areas to the north and south of the Fleches before it can fire, delaying the onset of the full bombardment for a turn. Eugene’s IV Corps advances to attack the village of Borodino, and Delzons’ 13th Division, already across the Voina near Bezzubovo, moves south and drives out the Russian Guard Jaeger regiment (the Jaeger B3 in the game), which loses half its strength and is effectively eliminated. The Russians could reasonably have expected this unit to be able to
retreat across the bridge from the French infantry, but historically it was taken by surprise, and in game terms it is the preliminary bombardment of Borodino by Eugene’s guns that destroys it. This opening attack on the northern flank succeeds for the time in diverting Kutuzov’s attention from Napoleon’s planned main attack in the center. Compans’ 5th Division of Davout’s I Corps advances toward the Fleches, supported by Friant’s 2nd and Dessaix’s 4th Divisions, not yet attacking the redoubt itself but securing the wooded areas to the north and in the western Utitskii forest to the south. Poniatowski’s V Corps begins advancing up the Old Smolensk Road toward Utitsa, the 16th Division (Krasinski) leading followed by artillery, cavalry and the 18th Division (Kniaziewicz). The Russians dispatch the Cossacks (Cossack 3) from the 2nd Army cavalry reserve toward Miyshina to cover the Russian southern flank.

**Borodino Village Area**

French (attacking): 13th Infantry Division (5) and IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (attacking from Bezzubovo area); IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) bombarding in support from area on New Smolensk Post Highway to the west of Borodino village across bridge (IV Corps HQ deployment area)

Russians (defending): Jager B3 (1)

Result: French capture Borodino village without loss, Russian Jager B3 eliminated (the Russians had expected the Jagers to be able to retreat back across the bridge over
Kolocha when attacked but they were taken by surprise, and in game terms the Jagers are effectively destroyed either by the preliminary bombardment or by the Horse Artillery attacking before the Jagers can retreat, though this does delay the movement of Eugene's heavy guns into Borodino)

7 am – The French activate Mortier, Davout, Poniatowski, Eugene, Murat, Ney and Junot, a heavy expenditure of supply, while the Russians have Bagration, Tuchkov and Barclay (to command artillery near Borodino) in action. Delzons’ division attempts to cross the Kolocha River at Borodino, flush from its victory over the Russian Jaegers, but is repulsed with losses by massed Russian artillery on the heights around Gorki. The Russians then burn the bridge over the road at Borodino. The French III and VIII Corps begin to advance toward the battle, III Corps entering the woods north of the Fleches. The French I Corps and Guard artillery, now all in range with some positioned along the edges of the woods to the north and south, pound the Fleches, and Compans’ division, joined by Dessaix’s division and backed by Friant’s division, then begins the first attack on the Fleches. These redoubts are defended by the Russian VIII Corps, with the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (Vorontsov) and 27th Division (Neverovski) holding the redoubts along with artillery, reinforced by the 2nd Grenadier Division (Mecklenberg) which had been covering Semyonovskoye; the IV Cavalry Corps (Sievers) covers the flank to the south, while the 12th Division (Vasil’chikov) of VII Corps protects the flank to the north at the Great Redoubt, and Borozdin is now positioned to the rear of the redoubt. The French break into the southernmost fleche but are then repulsed with heavy losses, and Marshal Davout is wounded in the fighting, but remains in command of his corps. This bloody setback effectively costs the French one of the divisions of I Corps, likely Dessaix’s weak unit which plays little part in the rest of the battle; with many French units massing behind Davout, who had expected to do better, Dessaix is likely unable to retreat without losing its last step in game terms. To the south, Poniatowski’s V Corps deploys for attack against Utitsa village, which is defended by the 1st Grenadier Division (Stroganov) of Tuchkov’s III Corps, backed up by Konovnitsyn’s 3rd Division to the rear, but Tuchkov is ordered to send his 3rd Division northward to aid in the developing battle for the Fleches.
7 AM: Les Fleches Area

French (attacking): 2nd Infantry Division (5) (across Kamenka stream from woods area to north of Les Fleches), 4th Infantry Division (3), 5th Infantry Division (4) (both from northwestern area of Utitskii Forest), Davout CHQ (2) (across Kamenka stream from Shevardino village area); supported by massive bombardment by Guard Heavy Artillery (2) (from Shevardino village area), I Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (from woods area north of Les Fleches), and I Corps Light Artillery (3) (from northwestern area of Utitskii Forest) - the French have had to set up this attack carefully by first occupying the northwestern Utitskii forest and woods north of Les Fleches in the 6 am turn, moving up their artillery and infantry to attack Les Fleches from multiple areas.

Russians (defending): 27th Infantry Division (initially at 3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), 2nd Grenadier Division (2), 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2)

Result: a bloody repulse for the French, in a battle that continues the full four rounds thanks to the double defense benefits of Les Fleches redoubt for the Russians; the French 4th Infantry Division is eliminated (unable to retreat through units of other corps massing behind without losing final step), and the 2nd and 5th Infantry Divisions and Davout CHQ all suffer multiple step losses but retreat back into northwestern Utitskii Forest and Shevardino village areas, while the Russian infantry divisions all suffer step losses as well but hold their ground. The French had made a powerful attack with good artillery support, but lacking cavalry for a combined arms effect, the attack still failed thanks to a vigorous defense by the elite Russian grenadier infantry and point-blank heavy artillery fire; the French would learn their lesson when next attacking Les Fleches.
8 am – On the French side, Eugene, Poniatowski, Junot, Ney, Davout and Murat are all activated, while the Russians activate Baggovut, Lavrov, Golitsyn, and Bagration, as well as Platov whose Cossacks move up to the eastern bank of the Kolocha. Eugene leaves Delzons’ division to garrison Borodino and moves up his artillery batteries to there, where they can fire on the Great Redoubt, while moving the rest of his infantry back out of Russian artillery range, with Ornano’s cavalry deployed around Bezzubovo covering his northern flank. Eugene’s two borrowed infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd, and Broussier’s 14th, begin to maneuver across the French Bridge to the south of the Kolocha. Poniatowski’s V Corps attacks the Russians at Utitsa and drives out the 1st Grenadier Division, which retreats and soon takes up a new position with artillery on the Utitskii Kurgan, since Tuchkov’s III Corps -- which likely could have held against the Poles at full strength -- has been weakened by having to detach its 3rd Division northward to aid the defense around the Fleches. Junot’s VIII Corps moves into the area of Kamenka Hill, near the western edge of the Utitskii Forest, to fill the gap between the French I and V Corps, in a position to aid either. The Russians begin to commit their reserves. Now that the direction of the French attack is clearer, Kutuzov and Barclay release Baggovut’s II Corps to begin marching toward the Russian left flank, with Platov’s Cossacks taking their place along the river. The Russians also start marching most of their V Guard Corps, including the 1st Cuirassiers Division (N.M. Borozdin), 1st Combined Grenadiers Division (Kantakuzin), and corps artillery, toward the battle in the center, and Duka’s 2nd Cuirassiers Division also moves up from the 2nd Army cavalry reserve to a position southeast of the Fleches. The French prepare to resume their assault on the Fleches; Ney takes the leading role around the Fleches after Davout is wounded though Davout continues to head his I Corps, and Ledru’s 10th Division and the 25th Wurttemberg Division of Ney’s III Corps (the 10/25 French infantry division in the game), as well as Razout’s 11th Division, advance to the north and center of the Fleches to join the battle, taking the place of Davout’s shot-up troops in the line. At the same time, some of Murat’s cavalry, including the I and III Corps cavalry divisions (the combined III Corps cavalry division in the game) and the I Cavalry Corps (Nansouty) and II Cavalry Corps (Montbrun), move into position to the center and south of the Fleches to enter the fighting as well. Bagration takes personal command of the Russian forces defending the Fleches.

8 AM Turn: Utitsa Village Area

French (attacking): Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area on Old Smolensk road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area to south of Old Smolensk Road west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), and Polish V Corps Cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) (from clear area to south of Utitsa village); supported by preliminary bombardment by Polish V Corps Light Artillery (2) from woods area on Old Smolensk Road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry
Division (2) (from woods area to south of Old Smolensk Road west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), and Polish V Corps Cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) (from clear area to south of Utitsa village); supported by preliminary bombardment by Polish V Corps Light Artillery (2) from woods area on Old Smolensk Road to west of Utitsa

Russians (defending): 1st Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), III Corps Light Artillery (1), Tuchkov CHQ (2)

Result: French occupy Utitsa village area, with Russians retreating along Old Smolensk Road toward Utitskii Kurgan; Russian 1st Grenadier Division and Tuchkov CHQ both take step losses, as does one of the Polish infantry divisions (18th). The Russian defense was weakened by having to send one of the divisions of III Corps, the 3rd Infantry, northward to support the defense around Les Fleches, while the Poles set up their attack carefully through preliminary maneuvering to launch a combined arms attack with their full corps strength from multiple directions with artillery support. In this way, even a relatively weak French (Polish) corps is able to dislodge a Russian corps despite the defensive benefit of the village on round 1. The Utitskii Kurgan is an even better defensive position, though, and the Russians realize it is more important to preserve the III Corps to defend there than to fight it out to the death for Utitsa village.

9 AM – The French have Napoleon (for the Guard artillery), Eugene, Ney, Junot and Murat all active, while the Russians activate Baggovut (to continue his southward march), Bagration, and Tuchkov (falling back to take up position on the Utitskii Kurgan). Poniatowski pauses to reorganize his Polish forces, realizing the Russian position is difficult to take unsupported. The French divisions of Morand (1st), Gerard (3rd) and Broussier (14th) in IV Corps have finished crossing the Kolocha River using the French Bridge and deploy for attack against the Great Redoubt into the woods, while French artillery starts to bombard the redoubt. Broussier’s division, in the lead, launches an attack toward the Great Redoubt through the woods but this is merely a reconnaissance in force, quickly broken off. The French at last launch a successful combined arms assault on the Fleches, Murat personally leading his I and II Cavalry Corps supported by the I and III Corps cavalry divisions into battle, while the 10th/25th Divisions and 11th Division of Ney’s corps provides the needed infantry spine for the fight, countering Russian attempts to form squares in defense. This powerful French attack overruns all the redoubts of the Fleches and effectively destroy the 2nd Combined Grenadiers and 27th Divisions and supporting artillery, only 2nd Grenadiers escaping for the moment. Razout’s 11th Division of III Corps probes toward Semyonovskoye unsuccessfully (again, like Broussier’s move, this is not a full attack, which would not be possible in the game before control of the Fleches, but more of a move into position through the Fleches area, where it is participating on the flank of the battle).

9 AM: Les Fleches Area
French (attacking): 10th/25th Infantry Division (4) from
Murat’s cavalry along with the 25th Wurttemberg Division (10th /25th Division), and Bagration is mortally wounded while 2nd Grenadier Division is effectively destroyed (though remnants continue to form part of the Russian line on the Semyonovskoye Heights). In game terms, a player will normally try to protect this valuable AHQ, but its loss could take place either from the elimination of the entire force with which it is fighting (though this did not happen here), or more likely through inability to retreat in time – either it could find itself unable to retreat through an overstreeacked area once down to its zero step, or, as a B-rated unit, the Russians could risk leaving it behind to cover the retreat while other C units escape first, but it could then end up destroyed by A or B-rated French defenders. The French finally secure the Fleches, and the remaining Russians around the Fleches fall back over the Semyonovskii stream, discouraged by Bagration’s loss. Dokhturov takes command of the Russian 2nd Army after Bagration is put out of action by his mortal wound. Eugene’s IV Corps soon thereafter launches a second, more serious assault on the Great Redoubt closely following Broussier’s reconnaissance, led by Morand’s 1st Division followed by Gerard’s 3rd Division, with Broussier’s 14th Division behind in support. This attack is also covered on the flank by the II Cavalry Corps, and supported by heavy artillery fire. In game terms, at most only three French units can make the attack into the Great Redoubt at this time, two from the woods and one from the Fleches across the Semyonovskii stream, since the Russians still control the Semyonovskaya heights. And since movement from the Fleches is effectively preempted by the Russian attack there first, the burden of the attack falls on just the two leading French infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd. The Great Redoubt is defended by Rayevski’s VII Corps with Vasil’chikov’s 12th and Paskevich’s 26th Divisions, and artillery in the redoubt itself as well as Rayevski’s CHQ, with the Russian II (Korf) and III (Kreutz) Cavalry Corps in reserve behind the position. Rayevski commands from the Great Redoubt in person. Morand’s division takes the brunt of the attack for the French and breaks into the Great Redoubt briefly, with the surviving Russians retreating back to the heights and across the Ognik after a stout defense that wears the French down, setting them up for a counterattack. Effectively, one of Rayevski’s infantry divisions is lost but not his corps artillery, and the corps is not broken like Borozdin’s, so Rayevski can still rally what remains to fight on. Poniatowski’s V Corps resumes its advance toward the Utitskii Kurgan.

10 AM: Les Fleches Area

Russians (attacking): Bagration AHQ (2, but reduced to 1 after having activated), 2nd Grenadier Division (2), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2), 3rd Infantry Division (2); supported by bombardment from VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Great Redoubt), II Army Light Artillery (3) (in Semyonovskoye village area, firing from the upslope position)

French (defending): 10th/25th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 11th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (3); reinforced by III Corps Cavalry Division (2) (commanded by Murat) (the I CC Cavalry Corps which had been in Les Fleches for the previous French attack has regrouped back to the Utitskii Forest to protect the flank)

Result: a disastrous repulse for the Russians, with 2nd Grenadier Division and the Bagration AHQ eliminated, though 2nd Cuirassier Division and the 3rd Infantry Division are able to retreat; the Russians had hoped that the weakened state of the French troops after taking the Fleches coupled with the preliminary bombardment would give them a chance to expel the French from the redoubts, but a stout French defense with reinforcements, even without getting the double defense for the redoubts (only the Russians enjoy this benefit), turned the tables. The French do suffer some further step losses in their infantry (1 each, leaving Ney's infantry divisions too weak to do much for the rest of the battle),
but not enough to make this counterattack worthwhile for the Russians, although the attack did serve another useful purpose, by preventing the French from sending reinforcements from the Les Fleches area to participate in their own attack on the Great Redoubt taking place in the same hour.

10 AM: Great Redoubt Area

French (attacking): 1st Infantry Division (4) and 3rd Infantry Division (5) (coming from woods to west of Great Redoubt, across Semyonovskii stream) (these are the two divisions Eugene has borrowed from Davout's I Corps); supported by bombardment from IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (moved up to Borodino) and IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (now moved back to IV Corps deployment area west of Borodino)

Russians (defending): Rayevski CHQ (2), 12th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 26th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1)

Result: a costly and temporary French victory, in a battle going 3 rounds, with one of Rayevski's two infantry divisions lost, but the CHQ, heavy artillery and the other Russian infantry division survive to fight on, retreating to the Goruzka Valley or the Semyonovskaya heights; the two French infantry divisions are also heavily reduced, to a strength of 2 each, but occupy the Great Redoubt in a position very vulnerable to Russian counterattack - which the Russians are well aware.

11 AM – The Russians activate Barclay, Platov, Baggovut (still completing his long march southward), Rayevski, Dokhturov, Lavrov, and also Osterman-Tolstoi, whose troops are brought forward into the center from their initial position along the Kolocha, while the French activate Davout, Ney and Poniatowski. The Russians take the initiative, and the French are ousted from the Great Redoubt by a counterattack mounted by the shot-up VII Corps aided by the 24th Division (Likhachev) of VI Corps, and III Cavalry Corps, with heavy artillery support. In game terms, the 24th Division can participate in this attack from across the Ognik stream, while the surviving division of VII Corps and III Cavalry Corps attack downhill from the Semyonovskoye area. Morand's 1st Division is especially hard hit, losing a captured regimental commander in the Great Redoubt, which greatly excites the Russians who at first believe they have captured Murat! Effectively, Morand’s division is destroyed though remnants continue to participate in the battle during the afternoon, the second division of Davout’s corps to be put out of action by heavy losses. The 4th Division (Wurttemberg) of II Corps has been diverted from its southward march and moved into position on the flank of the Russian counterattack. Even Barclay comes under French artillery fire during this desperate struggle, after which the fighting around the Great Redoubt falls off until mid-afternoon. The final Russian reserve, the Guards Division (Lavrov) along with 1st Combined Grendiers (Kantakuzin), moves up from reserve to a position behind Semyonovskoye on the Heights. And at this critical moment Platov’s Cossack Corps, joined by Uvarov’s I Cavalry Corps and some horse artillery, crosses the Kolocha River around Novoye Selo and Maloye Selo, beginning a sweeping counterattack against the French left flank. The Russians see an opportunity for decisively affecting the battle, with hardly any French units remaining north of the Kolocha, only a portion of IV Corps, and the French supplies and lines of communication exposed. In the south, Poniatowski maneuvers to the south of the Utitskii Kurgan, preparing to launch an attack on the hill from both the front and southern flank.

11 AM: Great Redoubt Area

Russians (attacking): 24th Infantry Division (3) (from Goruzka Valley area), and 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3) and 12th Infantry Division (2) (both from Semyonovskaya village area); supported by strong bombardment from VI Corps Heavy Artillery (2)(in area to east of Borodino across Kolocha river bridge), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Semyonovskoye village area), and I Army Light
Artillery (3) (in Goruzka Valley area). Rayevski's CHQ (at 1, reduced to 0 by activating) is nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, Dokhturov's CHQ (at 2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, having taken command of II Army in place of Bagration, but for this turn still directing the troops of his own corps, as he cannot function both as a CHQ and AHQ in the same turn), while Barclay further back commands the I Army artillery and 3 CC.

French (defending): 1st Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by bombardment), 3rd Infantry Division (2) (reduced to 1 by bombardment), reinforced by 14th Infantry Division (4) moving in from woods to west of Great Redoubt, as straggler.

Result: a Russian victory, recapturing the Great Redoubt and destroying the French 1st Infantry Division in the 1st round attack, though the 3rd Infantry Division, with the help of the 14th, manages to escape on the 2nd round, and the 14th also retreats after it suffers a step loss. This very effective combined arms counterattack was the most successful of the entire battle, taking out a significant part of the strength of Eugene's corps and enabling the Russians to hold the Great Redoubt for several hours more.

12 Noon – The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Davout, Poniatowski and Eugene, while the Russians activate Barclay (who with his command radius of 3 can control I Cavalry Corps north of the
Artillery (3) (in Goruzka Valley area). Rayevski's CHQ (at 1, reduced to 0 by activating) is nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, Dokhturov's CHQ (at 2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, having taken command of II Army in place of Bagration, but for this turn still directing the troops of his own corps, as he cannot function both as a CHQ and AHQ in the same turn), while Barclay further back commands the I Army artillery and 3 CC.

French (defending): 1st Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by bombardment), 3rd Infantry Division (2) (reduced to 1 by bombardment), reinforced by 14th Infantry Division (4) moving in from woods to west of Great Redoubt, as straggler.

Result: a Russian victory, recapturing the Great Redoubt and destroying the French 1st Infantry Division in the 1st round attack, though the 3rd Infantry Division, with the help of the 14th, manages to escape on the 2nd round, and the 14th also retreats after it suffers a step loss. This very effective combined arms counterattack was the most successful of the entire battle, taking out a significant part of the strength of Eugene's corps and enabling the Russians to hold the Great Redoubt for several hours more.

12 Noon – The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Davout, Poniatowski and Eugene, while the Russians activate Barclay (who with his command radius of 3 can control I Cavalry Corps north of the Kolocha), Platov, Osterman-Tolstoy, and Baggovut. At this phase of the battle, the initiative has shifted to the Russians in the north, but the French are still pressing the offensive in the center and south. Barclay has brought Osterman-Tolstoy’s IV Corps, transferred from the northern flank, into the gap behind Semyonovskoye between the Great Redoubt and the Guards infantry to bolster the Russian defense. The French launch a heavy assault on the Russian center around Semyonovskoye and to the south of the village, led by Davout, with elements of the French I Corps, and Murat with elements of the I and II Cavalry Corps supported by the IV Cavalry Corps, along with a strong artillery bombardment. In game terms, only three of the French infantry and
cavalry units can make this attack across the stream and onto the heights, likely the rallied 2nd Infantry Division and the I and II Cavalry Corps which are the strongest formations available to lead the assault. The village is defended by the 1st Combined Grenadiers with Konovnitsyn’s 3rd Division from III Corps, backed by the Guards Division, 1st Cuirassiers and Wurttemberg’s 4th Division from II Corps, as well as Sievers’ IV Cavalry Corps available on the flanks to the south, and strong artillery. The French cavalry, after overrunning some Russian line infantry, is unable to break through the squares of the Russian Guard, inside which even Barclay is forced to shelter for a time. However, the French bombardment has heavily weakened the Russians and Friant’s 2nd Division manages to seize the ruined village of Semyonovskoye from the Russians, and 3rd Division is effectively lost, forcing the Russians to fall back to avoid risking the Guard further.

Napoleon’s Marshals begin urging him to send the French Guard into the struggle for a decisive blow. The Russian cavalry, sweeping across the plain north of the Kolocha River, reaches Bezuzubo where it routs Ornano’s IV Corps cavalry division, effectively eliminating this formation during the battle. On the southern flank, Poniatowski’s Poles take the Utitskii Kurgan from the weakened Russians of III Corps, who retreat, with Tuchkov mortally wounded. In this fight, the Russian suffer the loss of the CHQ as well as some supporting Jaegers, though the artillery and 1st Grenadiers Division have fallen back in time. As with Bagration, the loss of this valuable CHQ could happen through destruction of the entire defending force, or, as is more likely in this case, through inability to retreat through an overstaked area once down to its zero step, or elimination by a French A unit while covering the retreat. But Baggovut’s II Corps has finally arrived with its 17th Division (Olsufiev) and artillery, and reinforces the battle, becoming the attacker after Tuchkov’s remnants have fallen back. Baggovut’s fresh troops supported by Russian militia succeed in their counterattack on the Utitskii Kurgan, throwing back the weakened Poles, who effectively lose one of their divisions. Baggovut is now in sole command on this flank (in game terms, Baggovut can lead his own corps and the militia, while the III Corps survivors must fight as stragglers).

12 Noon: Semyonovskoye Village Area, and Area to the South

French (attacking): 2nd Infantry Division (4) (attacking from Les Fleches into Semyonovskoye area), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (4) (attacking from Utitskii Forest into Semyonovskoye area) and 1 CC Cavalry Corps (4) (attacking into area south of Semyonovskoye across Semyonovskii stream from Utitskii Forest; supported by bombardment of Guard Heavy Artillery (2) from Les Fleches and Guard Light Artillery (3) from Utitskii Forest, both firing into Semyonovskoye village area.

Russians (defending): In Semyonovskoye village area - 3rd Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by preliminary bombardment), 1st Combined Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), II Army Light Artillery (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), reinforced by the Guards Infantry Division (6) (the unpinned VII Corps Heavy Artillery unit, which was in this area at the start, has moved to the Great Redoubt, making way for a Russian reinforcement to come in).

In area south of Semyonovskoye east of Semyonovskii stream - 4th Infantry Division (3), 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), II Army Cavalry Horse Artillery (1)

Result - an unlikely French victory in the Semyonovskoye village area, with the Guards Division, 1st Combined Grenadier Division and II Army Light Artillery all retreating after they take step losses, while the 3rd Infantry is eliminated, though the French cavalry and infantry both suffer step losses as well and are unable to push ahead again for some time; the French attack south of the Semyonovskoye area, unsupported by artillery, is more...
of a spoiling effort intended to prevent that area from being used for reinforcements or retreats by the Russians, and the French 1 CC cavalry fall back from there into the Utitskii Forest after taking a step loss. This attack secures the critical area of the heights for the French, who manage to hold it against Russian counter bombardments and attacks through the day, giving them a foothold for a flanking attack on the Great Redoubt later in the afternoon.

12 Noon: Utitskii Kurgan Area

French (Poles) (attacking): 16th Infantry Division (2) (from Old Smolensk Road to west of the Utitskii Kurgan), 18th Infantry Division (2) (from Sadovskoye swamp to south of Utitskii Kurgan). Most of the remainder of the Polish V Corps, including the Poniatowski CHQ commanding the attack (2, reduced to 1 for activating), and the corps artillery (2), are also in the Old Smolensk Road area west of the Kurgan but unable to take a role in the battle due to terrain limitations, with the Polish corps cavalry (1) and attached Voltigeurs B2 (1) in the area to the south of the road keeping an eye on the Russian Cossacks on the flank.

Russians (initially defending, then counterattacking): Tuchkov CHQ (at 0 step), III Corps Light Artillery (1), 1st Grenadier Division (1), Jagers B2 (1), but with unpinned III Corps Light Artillery moving out of area and 17th Infantry Division (3) of II Corps reinforcing area from Old Smolensk Road area to east, while Russian militia (Moscow 1, 3 steps) move into the Sadovskoye swamp vacated by the Polish infantry, restricting their retreat.

Result: Russian victory; initially the Poles are successful, with the Tuchkov CHQ and Jagers eliminated in the first round of the battle and the remnants of the 1st Grenadier Division retreating along the Old Smolensk Road, though one of the Polish divisions also takes a step loss; this shifts the Poles from the role of attacker to defender, but the fresh Russian 17th Division goes at them with the bayonet and routs the Poles from the Kurgan, eliminating one of the Polish divisions and reducing the other to 1 step, while losing a step of its own.

12 Noon: Bezzubovo Village

Russians (attacking): 1 Cossacks (3) and 2 Cossacks (3) (from area east of Bezzubovo across Korcheshka stream), and 1CC Cavalry Corps (3) (from Zhakarino area to south of Bezzubovo); the attack is supported by bombardment from the Cossack Horse Artillery (1) in the area east of Bezzubovo, where the Platov CHQ (2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also located, commanding the Cossacks. The 1 CC cavalry is separately commanded by Barclay’s AHQ from further away.

French (defending): IV Corps Cavalry Division (3)

Result: Russian victory, with the French IV Corps cavalry routed and effectively eliminated; the French, expecting to face mere Cossacks and choosing to put up a defense, were taken aback by the presence of the powerful Russian 1CC Cavalry Corps as well, and though the village initially afforded some protection, the French cavalry, outnumbered 3-1, were overrun, leaving Napoleon’s left flank open to the Russian cavalry.

1 pm – The French activate Murat and Napoleon, while the Russians activate Barclay, Platov. and Osterman-Tolstoi. In the north, Platov’s Cossacks cross the Voina stream, attacking across the dam (ford) at Bezzubovo and swinging far to the west through the woods toward Valuyevo and the French baggage trains on the New Smolensk Post Highway. In game terms, a Cossack breakthrough here could deprive the French army of a major part of its supply and cripple the attack – no wonder Napoleon was worried! Meanwhile, Uvarov moves along the bank of the Voina, covering the French position at Borodino to the south. However, the French deal with the attack of this strong Russian cavalry force by forming Delzons’ 13th Division, supported on the flank by the Italian Guard, into infantry squares, inside which Eugene takes shelter. The French infantry are prepared to meet the Russians who lack infantry support or
sufficient artillery. The Russian cavalry repeatedly charges the French squares with no success, and Uvarov’s advance is blocked by Delzons’ division and the Italian Guard north of Borodino. But as the Russian cavalry do not suffer heavy losses and are not pressing home their attacks strongly, it appears that their main purpose is just to cover Platov’s thrust westward. As Platov cannot command Uvarov’s regular cavalry, the I Cavalry Corps’ ability to attack depends on staying within range of Barclay or Kutuzov, or else attack as stragglers, so it is not surprising that Uvarov stays closer to the main body of the Russian army and does not charge westward through the Bezzubovskii Forest after Platov. Grouchy’s III Cavalry Corps moves to threaten the Russian cavalry north of the Kolocha, joined by remnants of Ornano’s cavalry. In the center, Osterman-Tolstoy’s IV Corps launches a counterattack against Semyonovskoye with at least one of its two divisions, 11th (N.N. Bakhmetiev) and 23rd (A.N. Bakhmetiev), but this is thrown back, with the corps commander wounded. Napoleon, who had been considering committing his Imperial Guard to the battle in the center to aid Eugene and protect Valuyev, while he commits the Guard artillery fully to join in the battle in the center. Napoleon himself moves up from his post at Shevardino to the left flank, prepared to take command there if needed.

1 PM: **Borodino Area**

Russians (attacking): 1 CC Cavalry Corps (3) (from Bezzubovo area)

French (defending): 13th Infantry Division (4, reduced from an earlier unsuccessful effort at 7 pm to force the Borodino Bridge before the Russians burned it), IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2)

Result: French victory; the Russian cavalry, finding itself confronted with strong infantry in squares supported by artillery, quickly pulls back after some charging at the French positions, suffering little loss.

2 PM – The Russians activate Platov, Barclay, Rayevski, Dokhturov, Kutuzov and Lavrov, reordering their lines in the center, while the French activate Junot (who by this point has been nearly forgotten – his men were actually ordered to stack arms in the Utitskii Forest), Napoleon, Davout and Ney. Junot’s Westphalian VIII Corps finally links up with Poniatowski’s V Corps, its 23rd Division (Tharreau) facing off against the Russian 4th Division which has moved down from the center, while the Westphalian 24th Division (von Ochs) guards the northern flank of the corps (these two Westphalian divisions are combined in the game and fight as a single unit). The crisis past in the north, some fighting resumes around Semyonovskoye between Davout with his battered I Corps and Ney with his III Corps against the Russian center, but to little effect. The Russian cavalry makes its final attacks on the French in the north and then starts to fall back, unable to break the French squares. However, the cavalry counterattack has brought the Russians critical time in the center, where Russian artillery is bombarding the immobile French cavalry around the Great Redoubt and Semyonovskoye.

2 PM: **Valuyev Village Area**

Russians (attacking): 1 Cossacks (3) and 2 Cossacks (3) (from wooded area north of Valuyoevo)

French (defending): Middle Guard (4)
Result: French victory; the overextended Cossacks, finding themselves confronted by French Guard infantry formed up in squares to protect the main supply road, beat a hasty retreat despite their numerical superiority. By this time the French have formed a line from Borodino all the way to northwest of Valuyevo, including the troops mentioned above as well as the 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3), Italian Guard (2), and Legion of the Vistula (2), and Voltigeurs B3 and B2 (1 each) to cover their northern flank and supplies against the Russian cavalry raiders. Faced with this solid opposition, the Russian cavalry now decide to fall back whence they came.

3 PM - Napoleon, Eugene, Murat and Junot all activate on the French side, while the Russians activate Barclay and Platov. Napoleon returns to his post at Shevardino, with his northern flank stabilized. The Russian cavalry there withdraws toward the Kolocha again. In the south, Junot pushes forward through the eastern Utitskii Forest to take up positions north of the Utitskii Kurgan. The French renew their assault on the Great Redoubt, the third and finally successful attempt. Everything available is committed short of the Guard, still in reserve apart from its artillery. Montbrun’s II Cavalry Corps leads the way along with Latour-Maubourg’s IV Cavalry Corps on the southern side of the redoubt, as the French massed artillery batteries bombard the redoubt in a crossfire from positions extending between Borodino and the Fleches. Supporting the attack are elements of Grouchy’s III Cavalry Corps on the northern side of the redoubt, though this corps has not yet fully moved down from fending off the Cossacks in the north. The infantry component of this combined arms attack is provided by three of Eugene’s infantry divisions, Broussier’s 14th, Gerard’s 3rd, and the remnants of Morand’s 1st, attacking from the front of the redoubt. In game terms, only four of these six units can be fully committed to the battle, and the ones fully engaged are the French II and IV Cavalry Corps, and likely Broussier and Gerard, since Morand was badly shot up in the earlier assault and thrown back from the redoubt, while Grouchy’s cavalry is not fully present and stays in reserve. The Great Redoubt is now defended by artillery and the Russian 24th Division of VI Corps, supported on the flank by the 11th Division of the Russian IV Corps and the III Corps Cavalry, along with the 7th Division (Kaptsevich) of VI Corps on the right flank, backed up by the II Cavalry Corps, the 23rd Division of the Russian IV Corps guarding the left, and the battered 12th and 26th Divisions (effectively just one division remaining) of VII Corps in the rear. Once again, only four of these units can actually defend the redoubt area in game terms, including the 24th Division and likely the 11th Division, the III Cavalry Corps, and the artillery.
in the redoubt, with others in reserve in the Goruzka Valley area behind the redoubt or the area to the north of the Stonets. The fighting around the redoubt is immensely bloody, and the first to break in are French or allied German and Polish cavalry coming from the rear, followed by the infantry to the front. The artillery is lost, the Russian 24th Division is destroyed and its commander Likhachev captured, the most senior Russian general taken prisoner in the battle, with the 11th Division damaged sufficiently to be out of action as well, though the cavalry retreat in time. Likhachev is brought before Napoleon, who attempts to make the gesture of returning the general’s sword, but Likhachev fails to accept the weapon and the frustrated Emperor finally commands, “Take this idiot away!”

3 PM: Great Redoubt Area

French (attacking): 2 CC Cavalry Corps (4) and 4 CC Cavalry Corps (from Semyonovskoye village area), 3rd Infantry Division (2) and 14th Infantry Division (4) (from woods to west of Great Redoubt; supported by strong bombardment from IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (Borodino area), IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (from IV Corps deployment area west of Borodino) and Guard Heavy Artillery (2) (from Les Fleches)

Russians (defending): 24th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 11th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1)

Result: Decisive French victory, with the French securing control of the Great Redoubt and the Russian 24th and 11th Infantry Divisions destroyed along with the VII Corps Heavy Artillery, though the 3 CC Cavalry retreat in time to escape, and the French 2CC cavalry and 14th Infantry suffer step losses. The powerful combined arms attack with strong artillery support proves enough this time to overcome even the double defense benefit of the Great Redoubt, and with the Semyonovskaya Heights under French control as well, this time the Russians are not able to mount an effective counterattack.
4 PM - The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Junot and Poniatowski, while Barclay, Kutuzov, Platov, Baggovut and Lavrov all activate on the Russian side. In the south the Westphalians of VIII Corps, supported by the French 5th Division, press the Russian 17th Division backward, while the Poles threaten the Utitskii Kurgan again. Following their victory at the Great Redoubt, the French press forward with Eugene’s command and their cavalry against the Russian center, held by the surviving 7th Division of VI Corps as well as the 23rd Division of IV Corps, and the Russian II and III Cavalry Corps, and repel Russian counterattacks. However, the French cavalry is unable to break the Russian infantry squares. Barclay now commits all of his remaining cavalry to a counterattack, leading to the largest cavalry melee of the battle, in which the Russian II and III Cavalry Corps are all heavily engaged with the French on the plateau to the east of the Great Redoubt, while the Russian Guards and 1st Cuirassiers advance toward the French lines on the Semyonovskaya Heights. Though the lines do not shift significantly on either side, the cavalry battles effectively cost the French one of their already weakened cavalry corps, likely IV Cavalry. Barclay, personally leading the Russians, has several horses shot out from under him. Artillery on both sides pounds the combatants. In the north, Platov’s and Uvarov’s cavalry finish their retreat over the Kolocha. In the south, the Westphalians of VIII Corps advance against Baggovut’s forces, leading the
Russians to fall back about half a mile. The Poles and Westphalians are now engaged in both artillery duels and melee with the Russians in the woods south of Semyonovskoye and on the Utitskii Kurgan, with the Westphalian 23rd Division supporting the Poles while the smaller 24th Division occupies the gap between Poniatowski’s Poles and Davout’s I Corps (again, these two divisions are fighting together as one unit in the same area in game terms). After hearing of the fall of the Great Redoubt, Poniatowski launches a two-pronged attack on the Utitskii Kurgan from the north and south. The Russians are defending the hill with the 17th Division of II Corps, supported by the weakened 1st Grenadier Division, Karpov’s Cossack cavalry and Moscow militia on the flanks. Though the northern attack is repulsed, the southern attack makes good progress and takes the Utitskii Kurgan, the last major French victory of the battle.

4 PM: Goruzka Valley Area, east of Great Redoubt

French (attacking): 2 CC Cavalry (3) and 1 CC Cavalry (3) (from Semyonovskoye village area), 4 CC Cavalry (2) (from Great Redoubt)

Russians (defending): 7th Infantry Division (3), 23rd Infantry Division (2), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (2), 3 CC Cavalry Corps (2)

Result: Russian victory. The massed French cavalry repulsed by the effective combination of infantry in squares and strong Russian cavalry support; the French cavalry all suffer step losses, and one of their cavalry units, 4CC, is effectively destroyed. The French victory at the Great Redoubt had placed them beyond the range of the artillery bombardment support they normally depended on for their successful attacks. After this experience, they would bring their most powerful artillery units up onto the heights, to renew their bombardment of the Russian lines.

4 PM: Semonovskoye Village Area

Russians (attacking): Guard Infantry Division (4) (from woods to east of Semyonovskoye village area), 1st Cuirassier Division (2) (from area south of woods, to east of Semyonovskoye village area); supported by bombardment from Guard Light Artillery (3) (from woods to east of Semyonovskoye village area)

French (defending): 2nd Infantry Division (4, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), Guard Light Artillery (3)

Result: French victory. The Russians had thought to take advantage of the French cavalry moves into the Goruzka valley to strike at their weakened position on the Semyonovskaya Heights, but even so the French defense reinforced by their Guard artillery at last moving up proves too strong to risk the Russian Guards, who pull back.

4 PM: Utitskii Kurgan Area

French (Poles and Westphalians) (attacking): Polish 16th Division (2) (from the Sadovskoye Swamp area, having pushed the Russian militia back out again), V Corps Light Artillery (2) (from area west of Kurgan on Old Smolensk Road), 23rd/24th Westphalian Infantry Division (4) (from Utitskii Forest north of Kurgan); supported by bombardment from VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) on Old Smolensk Road west of Kurgan. Poniatowski (2, reduced to 1 by activating) is in the Old Smolensk road area east of the Kurgan commanding his troops, with his cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) to the south of the road covering the flank against the Russian Cossacks, and Junot (1, reduced to 0 by activating) is in the Utitskii Forest area northwest of Poniatowski, while his cavalry (1) remains in the eastern Utitskii forest area, with these other troops not being committed to the battle.

Russians (defending): 17th Infantry Division (2, reduced from earlier fighting), II Corps Heavy Artillery (2), reinforced by one militia unit (Smolensk, at 3, from the Old Smolensk Road area east of the Kurgan). Other Russian troops are nearby covering the flanks, including Cossacks 3 at Miyshina, Russian Moscow militia in the woods to

result: Russian victory, with the
the south, and Baggovut's CHQ
(2, reduced to 1 for activating)
and the weakened 1st Grenadier
Division (1) behind the Kurgan
on the Old Smolensk Road to the
east, but are not committed to the
final battle.

Result: A hard-fought French
victory, the last one of the battle
on Sept. 7. Though the Polish
infantry suffers a step loss and
the Westphalian infantry suffers
two step losses, the Russian
infantry, militia and artillery
units each lose a step too, but
retreat from the Kurgan in time
to avoid elimination.

After the 4 pm turn, the
action starts to die down. The
French, in game terms, have
secured enough points to be
confident of a win, with firm
control of three of the five
redoubts (Shevardino, Les
Fleches, Great Redoubt) and
heavier Russian point losses for
eliminated units than for the
French, including the losses of
one Russian AHQ (Bragration)
and one Russian CHQ
(Tuchkov). For the French,
many of whose units are badly
battered, further attacks only risk
losing units and are unnecessary,
and so the French content
themselves with opportunistic
artillery barrages against the
Russian lines hoping for another
kill, or at least to damage the
Russians enough to deter
counterattacks. And the
Russians, at last tiring of this
punishment by the French guns,
pull their front back about one
area along most of their front line
to minimize further losses,
unable to find any good place to
mount a further counterattack;
though many of the French
divisions are weakened and
vulnerable, the Russians are even
more so, with no intact reserves
remaining.

5 pm – For the French, Napoleon
and Murat are activated, while the
Russians activate Barclay, Lavrov
and Baggovut. The great cavalry
melee starts to die down in the
center, the last French cavalry
attacks taking place. Napoleon
leaves Shevardino and advances to
the Semyonovskaya heights, to
inspect the captured redoubts and
Semyonovskoye village, coming
under Russian fire. Some of
Napoleon’s Marshals once again
urge him to commit his Guard for
a final breakthrough, but other
Marshals advise against it and
again he refuses, unwilling to risk
his last reserve and shocked by the
small numbers of Russian
prisoners. Instead, Napoleon opts
to continue artillery attacks on the
Russians in the center, and the
French Guard artillery is brought
into position on the
Semyonovskaya Heights. The
Russian Guard threatens to
counterattack Semyonovskoye, but
is deterred by the French artillery
and instead forms squares to block
the French cavalry.

6 pm – The Russians activate
Baggovut and Kutuzov, while the
French activate Napoleon and
Murat. Baggovut, after an
unsuccessful counterattack with
the 4th Division which has at last
arrived from the center to rejoin II
Corps, starts to withdraw his army
along the Old Smolensk Road.
The French launch no further
melee attacks, but instead begin
an artillery duel in the center,
pounding the Russian Guard
drawn up to hold off the French
cavalry. Kutuzov agrees to pull
his army back about a mile,
planning to align it with the
Russian reserve artillery across
the central plateau, along a front
running from Gorki to Psarevo.
Kutuzov does not yet realize the
full extent of the Russian losses
and overestimates the French
ones, believing that he can
counterattack the next day after
replenishing overnight.

7 pm – The French activate
Napoleon, while the Russians
activate Kutuzov, Baggovut,
Barclay, Lavrov, Osterman-
Tolstoy, Dokhturov, and
Golitsyn to conduct their planned
withdrawal. The artillery duel
between the French and Russians
continues sporadically, and the
Russian Guards Division suffers
heavy losses, as the Russians
complete their withdrawal into
the new position. Both armies
seek to rest and replenish their
heavily damaged forces.

8 pm - The Russians activate
Kutuzov, Barclay and Dokhturov
to complete their planned
withdrawal, while the French do
not choose to activate leaders this
time, seeing the battle as won
and with the Russians mostly out
of range. The battle dies down as
darkness approaches, and the
armies continue to rest and
resupply. Kutuzov, finally
realizing how badly the Russian
army has suffered, and that Napoleon still has intact reserves – the Old Guard and Guard Cavalry have remained inactive throughout the battle – decides after nightfall not to continue the battle and withdraws toward Mozhaisk along the two main roads running south of the Moskva. The French attempt no immediate pursuit, being too exhausted by the fighting.

During the Sept. 7 scenario, both sides have available 60 supply points, 4 for each of the 15 turns, as neither side lost any supply sources. In addition, the French can draw down 17 steps with their leaders for activations before reaching the zero steps, while the Russians can draw down 23 steps with their leaders for activations before reaching the zero steps, giving the French a maximum of 77 supply points and the Russians 83. The French, based on activations of leaders alone, have used 53, while the Russians have used 61 for their leaders, leaving the French just 24 supply points and the Russians 22 to provide resupply for damaged units and keep leaders able to fight. It is hardly surprising, after 15 turns of battle, that both the French and Russian armies are severely weakened in step strength, as it has been impossible for either side to keep up with the heavy losses. The French Guard is the only intact corps remaining on the field of battle.

The Russian and French Losses

Russian losses have been calculated at 44,000-50,000 men, with the higher figure probably accounting for Shevardino losses as well. Among the top leadership, Bagration and Tuchkov were both mortally wounded, with other corps commanders including Osterman-Tolstoy and possibly Borozdin wounded. The Russians also had numerous divisional commanders either killed (Kantakuzin in 1st Combined Grenadiers), or wounded (Konovnitsyn from III Corps, both Bakhmetiev's commanding the two divisions of IV Corps, and all three of the division commanders in VIII Corps, Neverovski, Mecklenberg, and Vorontsov). The Russians kept good accounts of the losses of their regular formations after the battle, although there are no records for the Cossacks and only partial ones for the militia. Several Russian units were evidently shattered during the battle, with very heavy losses. These include all three of the divisions of VIII Corps, the 27th, 2nd Grenadiers, and 2nd Combined Grenadiers, as well as the corps artillery, mostly lost with the fall of the Fleches. The Russians also lost the bulk of the 24th Division of VI Corps with the fall of the Great Redoubt in the afternoon, along with its commander Likhachev captured, the highest ranking Russian prisoner, and the artillery of VII Corps in the redoubt. One Jaeger regiment, representing the Guard Jaeger regiment screen, was shattered in Borodino at the outset, and likely another in the fighting on the southern flank. Some other Russian divisions, likely including one from VII Corps, one from IV Corps, and one from III Corps, may be considered shattered as well. However, no Russian cavalry corps or divisions were badly damaged enough to be considered shattered, and some of them came off with relatively little damage. The Russians lost about 40 guns, enough to account for the two artillery units from VII and VIII Corps, but not severe damage to the artillery.

From the available data, it appears that on the Russian side, I Cavalry Corps lost only about 4-5% of its strength, about 101-129 men, reflecting its failure to press the attack against the French at Borodino. On the other hand, II and III Cavalry Corps, which fought harder in the center, lost about 16% of their combined strength, 1184 men. IV Cavalry Corps also was not badly hit, with 324-325 men lost, 9%. Of the Russian cavalry formations, the cuirassier divisions were the most heavily engaged and suffered the most losses, 592 for the 1st Cuirassier, 25%, and 630-31 for the 2nd Cuirassier, 27%. Infantry losses were much more severe. Of the two corps that fought in the south, II Corps lost 3718-3764, 36%, while III Corps lost 3237-3294, 40-41%. The forces in the center from 1st Army had comparably heavy losses. IV Corps lost 3739-3763, or 39-40% and VI Corps lost 3616-
French divisions were shattered after the battle, since no complete records remain of individual infantry division losses in the Grande Armée after Borodino. But the corps-level losses are known, and from this it is evident that Davout’s I Corps and the Polish V Corps suffered the most heavily, as well as Murat’s cavalry. It is likely that one or two of Davout’s divisions were effectively shattered (likely Dessaix’s 4th and Morand’s 1st), as well as one of Murat’s cavalry corps (Montbrun’s II Cavalry, Nansouty’s I Cavalry and Latour-Maubourg’s IV Cavalry all suffered heavy damage, and of these IV Cavalry was the weakest to begin with in cavalry, so the most likely loss from the final cavalry struggles) and one of the Polish divisions (16th or 18th). Ornano’s IV Corps cavalry may also have been shattered by the initial impact of Uvarov’s and Platov’s cavalry at Bezzubovo, for when it appears later at Moscow it is a shadow of its former power. But on the French side, it is clear that no artillery units were lost; the French artillery strength at Moscow was nearly equal to what they had at Borodino, and it appears that only 8 French guns were lost at Borodino.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Corps</th>
<th>At Borodino</th>
<th>Moscow end of Sept.</th>
<th>Moscow Oct. 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>18,849, 109 guns</td>
<td>18,706</td>
<td>22,480, 112 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>40,392, 147 guns</td>
<td>24,818</td>
<td>28,949, 144 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>13,186, 75 guns</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>10,498, 71 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>25,021, 88 guns</td>
<td>27,326</td>
<td>25,624, 92 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>10,328, 50 guns</td>
<td>6,923</td>
<td>5,712, 49 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Corps</td>
<td>9,656, 30 guns</td>
<td>5,000 est.</td>
<td>5,691, 34 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Cav. Corps</td>
<td>17,685, 88 guns</td>
<td>11,759</td>
<td>9,000, 67 guns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Napoleon had 135,117 men and 587 guns available for Borodino, at the end of September in Moscow he had 100,775 and 571 guns, and at the time he left Moscow, with reinforcements that had caught up and return of lightly wounded troops to the ranks, his strength had actually grown to 107,954 men, with 569 guns. The Guard, not committed to combat at Borodino apart from the artillery, suffered insignificant losses, and was actually stronger on leaving Moscow than it had been at Borodino due to the arrival of reinforcements including the rest of the Young Guard. However, I Corps had massive losses of at least 11,500 and more likely close to 15,000 men. III Corps lost between 2,600 and 4,900 men. For IV Corps, these figures appear to show no losses, but that is because of the addition of the 6000 men of Pino’s 15th Division to IV Corps after the battle; taking that into account, IV Corps losses appear more like 2,700 men. Polish V Corps losses were about 3,400. Westphalian VIII Corps suffered losses of about 4,000 by the time it left Moscow, and while this probably includes some post-battle attrition,
it is known to have suffered at least 1433 battle losses. Finally, losses to the four corps of the Reserve Cavalry appear to have been about 5,800; the most heavily hit were I Corps (down to 2,721 at the end of September from 5,159) and IV Corps (down to 1,775 at the end of September from 3600), while III Cavalry Corps came off lightly with 3,000 men remaining at the end of September out of 3,583, and II Cavalry Corps still had 4,263 men out of 5,343, but this included cavalry from Ney’s III Corps counted with them at that time. These totals largely account for the 32,000 that the French likely lost between the two days of battle at Shevardino and Borodino.

Between the two sides, there were over 50,000 dead or mortally wounded left on the field. Borodino was a French victory by all the standards normally used to define the outcome of battles: the French held the field, and their losses had been less than that of their opponents. In game terms, the French have ended with about 22 victory points (6 for redoubts, 5 for the two Russian AHQs and CHQs lost, and 11 for other Russian units killed) to the Russian 12 (2 for the remaining redoubts in Russian hands, and 10 for 5 French units killed, as the Russians get two points for each French kill), a clear French battle win with a margin of 10 points. On the northern front above the Kolocha, the Russians actually appear to have an edge in points, with 2 points for the IV Corps cavalry division vs. 1 French point for the jaegers killed in Borodino. And on the southern front, honors are nearly, with 2 Russian points for killing a Polish division vs. 3 French points for the Tuchkov CHQ and some Jaegers.

But in reality, Napoleon had missed the last chance he would have to deal a decisive blow to the Russians by destroying Kutuzov’s army, the only thing that might have brought the Tsar to the negotiating table or enabled him to maintain his position in Russia over the coming winter. To claim a decisive victory of that magnitude, in game terms, the French would likely need to have a margin of 20 points or more over the Russians.

**The Aftermath**

The Russian defeat at Borodino led directly to the fall of Moscow a week later. Though the Russians could eventually draw on many reserves to replace their losses, it would still take time to rebuild from the heavy losses of Borodino, amounting to about a third of the army. In a dramatic debate at Fili, the Russian commanders divided on whether to fight another battle to defend Moscow, and Kutuzov finally had to take the momentous decision to abandon Russia’s ancient capital. On the French side, though losses had only amounted to somewhat under a quarter of the army, and the Guard remained intact, replacements were a more serious problem. Napoleon’s resources were not yet exhausted. On the evening after the battle on Sept. 7’s, Pino’s Italian 15th Division rejoined Eugene’s IV Corps. The remainder of the Young Guard also caught up with Napoleon by Moscow, and other troops filtered in there, so that the Guard and IV Corps actually found themselves stronger after their stay in Moscow than they had been just before Borodino. But Tsar Alexander would not negotiate with Napoleon, for he still had an army in the field, and Napoleon’s position in Moscow, at the far end of the long rapier thrust into Russia, was becoming more tenuous every day. The vulnerability of the French was now apparent, even at the high water mark of the Grande Armée’s advance; raiding Cossacks could easily cut Napoleon’s lines of communication back to France, and the reviving strength of
Kutuzov’s army menaced the French position, while the Russian reinforcements arriving from the Army of the Danube in the south and Finland in the north now enabled the Russians to press on the French flanks and threaten to cut off Napoleon’s retreat entirely. Napoleon spoke truly when he afterward remarked about Borodino that no battle had cost him so much or gained him so little.

When Napoleon finally left Moscow in mid-October, he still had over 100,000 men available, and nearly as much artillery as at Borodino. But, blocked by the Russians from retreating into the Ukraine where ample supplies were still available, the French had to retrace their route through Smolensk and the devastated lands of Byelorussia and Lithuania, with Kutuzov in close pursuit. What was left of the Grande Armée, even with reinforcements from drawing in the corps guarding the flanks and Victor’s IX Corps reserves, steadily disintegrated during the late fall and winter march. The crossing of the Berezina in late November was the last straw; though Napoleon narrowly escaped being cut off by the forces of Chichagov, with the merged 3rd Army and Army of the Danube, to the south, and Wittgenstein’s corps to the north, with Kutuzov pressing from behind, only remnants were left after this battle from the 50,000 Napoleon still had at its start. By the time Napoleon abandoned the army to return to France in early December, only the Guard retained any semblance of order, and a bare 10,000 troops under arms, with a host of stragglers behind, made the last march to Vilna and the Russian border. Marshal Ney, who had commanded the rearguard through the retreat, earning the title “bravest of the brave” from Napoleon, was said to be the last man of the Grande Armée to leave Russia. The old Grande Armée that had won so many victories for Napoleon had effectively been destroyed in Russia. Though the Emperor still commanded a large army in Spain, and reserves from which a new army in Germany could be reconstituted in 1813, and his most experienced Marshals remained to lead that force, the fighting power of the Grande Armée would never be the same again, and the legend of Napoleon’s invincibility was shattered forever.

**The French Order of Battle at Borodino (Composition of Game Units)**

**Napoleon AHQ** – army staff, escort - 1 bn. 2nd Baden Line Rgt., Portuguese Legion Chasseurs Rgt. (3 sq.), 28th Chasseurs Rgt. (2 sq., detached from regiment in III Corps), Saxon Prinz Albrecht Chevau-Leger Rgt. (1 sq., detached from regiment in III Cavalry Corps) = 1 bn., 6 sq.

There is considerable difference in the sources regarding which units were attached to Napoleon’s AHQ at Borodino, but these are all units known to have been attached to the AHQ when it reached Moscow.

**Imperial Guard**

**Imperial Guard**

- Mortier CHQ – corps staff
  - Old Guard Infantry – 1st, 2nd, 3rd Grenadiers, 1st, 2nd Foot Chasseurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 10 bns.
  - Middle Guard Infantry – 1st Voltigeurs, 1st Tirailleurs, Fusiliers-Chasseurs, Fusiliers-Grenadiers Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), combined with 1 brigade of Young Guard, 4th, 5th Voltigeurs, 4th Tirailleurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 14 bns.
  - (Legion of the) Vistula Infantry – 1st, 2nd, 3rd Vistula Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 6 bns.
  - Guard Heavy Artillery – 6 foot batteries (49 guns)
  - Guard Light Artillery – 4 foot (30 guns), 4 horse batteries (24 guns), 6 regimental guns
  - Guard Cavalry – Horse Grenadiers, Horse Chasseurs, Empress Dragoons Rgts. (5 sq. ea.), 1st Polish Lancers, 2nd Dutch Lancers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Gendarmes d’élite (2 sq.), Mamelukes (1 sq.) = 26 sq.

**I Corps**

- Davout CHQ – corps staff
  - 1st Infantry – 13th Light, 17th, 30th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.) (+ 1 bn. of 2nd Baden Rgt. detached to AHQ) = 15 bns
  - 2nd Infantry – 15th Light, 33rd Line, 48th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.), ½ Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 17 bns. 3rd Infantry – 7th Light, 12th, 21st Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.), and 127th Line Rgt. (2 bns.)(in reserve, guarding I Corps parks), 1st Mecklenburg Bn. from 8th Rhine
Confederation Rgt. (1 bn.) (in reserve, guarding I Corps parks) = 18 bns.
5th Infantry – 25th, 57th, 61st, 111th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.) = 20 bns.
I Corps Heavy Artillery – 6 foot batteries (48 guns)
I Corps Light Artillery – 2 foot batteries (16 guns), 5 horse batteries (30 guns), 53 regimental guns

III Corps

Ney CHQ – corps staff
10th/25th Infantry – from 10th Division 24th Light, 46th, 72nd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns.
13th Infantry – 8th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 84th, 92nd, 106th Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns.
14th Infantry – 18th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 9th, 35th, 53rd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), ½ Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns.

IV Corps

Eugene CHQ – corps staff
Italian Guard Infantry – Guard Inf., Guard Conscript Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), Royal Velites (2 bns.) = 6 bns.
13th Infantry – 8th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 84th, 92nd, 106th Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns.
14th Infantry – 18th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 9th, 35th, 53rd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), ½ Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns.

V Corps

Poniatowski CHQ – corps staff
16th Infantry – 3rd, 15th, 16th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns.
18th Infantry – 2nd, 8th, 12th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns.
V Corps Cavalry – 1st Polish Chasseurs Rgt. (1 sq. present, others at Smolensk), 4th, 5th Polish Chasseurs Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), 12th Polish Lancers Rgt. (4 sq.), 13th Polish Hussars Rgt. (4 sq.) = 17 sq.

VIII Corps

Junot CHQ – corps staff
23rd/24th Infantry – from 23rd Division – 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th Westphalian Line Rgts. (2 bns. ea., 3 bns. in 7th), 2 Westphalian Light bns.; from 24th Division – 1 guard grenadier, 1 guard jaeger, 1 jaeger-carabinier, 1 light bns., all Westphalian = 15 bns.

(Reserve) Cavalry Corps

Murat CHQ – corps staff
I Cavalry Corps (1CC) – in 1st Heavy Cavalry Division - 2nd, 3rd, 9th, Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 1st Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 5th Heavy Cavalry Division - 6th, 11th, 12th Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 5th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (1 sq.); in 1st Light Cavalry Division - 7th, 8th Hussars Rgts., 9th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt., 16th Chasseurs Rgt., 6th, 8th Polish Lancers Rgts., 2nd Combined Prussian Hussar Rgt. (4 sq. ea.) = 55 sq.
II Cavalry Corps (2CC) – in 2nd Heavy Cavalry Division - 5th, 8th, 10th Cuirassiers Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), 2nd Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 4th Heavy Cavalry Division - 1st Cuirassier Rgt. (4 sq.), 1st, 2nd Carabinier Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), 4th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (1 sq.); in 2nd Light Cavalry Division - 11th, 12th Chasseurs Rgt. (3 sq. ea.), 5th, 9th Hussars Rgt., 3rd Wurttemberg Jaeger-zu-Pferde Rgt., (4 sq. ea.), 10th Polish Hussars Rgt. (3 sq. ea.), 1st Combined Prussian Uhlan Rgt. (4 sq. ea.) = 52 sq.

III Cavalry Corps (3CC) – in 6th Heavy Cavalry Division - 7th, 23rd, 28th, 30th Dragoon Rgt. (3 sq. ea.); in 3rd Light Cavalry Division - 6th Hussars Rgt. (3 sq.), 6th, 8th, 25th Chasseurs Rgt. (3 sq. ea., except 4 sq. in 8th), 1st, 2nd Bavarian Chevau-Leger Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), Saxon Prinz Albrecht Chevau-Leger Rgt. (3 sq., +1 detached to AHQ) = 36 sq.

IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) – in 7th Heavy Cavalry Division - Saxony Garde du Corps (Cuirassiers) Rgt., Saxony Zastrow Cuirassiers Rgt., 1st, 2nd Westphalian Cuirassiers Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), 14th Polish Cuirassiers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 4th Light Cavalry Division - 3rd, 15th, 16th Polish Lancers (3 sq. ea.) = 27 sq.

Horse Artillery 1 (I, II Cavalry Corps) – 10 horse batteries (54 guns)
Horse Artillery 2 (III, IV Cavalry Corps) - 7 horse batteries (34 guns)

Voltigeurs (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 – represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments

The Russian Order of Battle at Borodino (Composition of Game Units)

Kutuzov AHQ – corps staff, escort - 1 bn. Selenginsk Rgt. from III Corps, 1 bn. Combined Grenadiers from IV Corps, Ingermanland, Kargopol Dragoon Rgs. (4 sq. ea.) from II Cavalry Corps = 2 bns., 8 sq. (the available information does not clearly identify which of the 1st Army AHQ escorts were with the Kutuzov AHQ and which were with the Barclay AHQs, which operated near to each other; the assignment of most of the escorts to Kutuzov, while giving the Cossack escort to Barclay, parallels the Cossack escort of Bagration’s AHQ)

I Army

Barclay AHQ – army staff, escort - 2nd Bug Cossacks Rgt. (5 sq.)
I Army Heavy Artillery – 2 position batteries (24 guns)
I Army Light Artillery – 7 light batteries (84 guns)
I Army Horse Artillery – 7 horse batteries (including ones attached to cavalry corps) (84 guns)
I Cavalry Corps (1CC) – Life Guard Dragoon, Life Guard Uhlan, Life Guard Hussar Rgt. (4 sq. ea.), Life Guard Cossack Rgt. (3 sq), Black Sea Guard Cossack sotnia (1 sq.), Yelizavetgrad Hussar Rgt. (8 sq.), Nezhinsk Dragoon Rgt. (4 sq.) = 28 sq.
II Cavalry Corps (2CC) – Moscow Dragoon, Pskov Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Izumsk Hussar, Polish Uhlan Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 24 sq.

II Corps

Baggovut CHQ – corps staff
4th Infantry – Tobolsk, Volhynia, Kremenchug, Minsk Rgts., 4th, 34th Jaeger Rgts (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns.
II Corps Heavy Artillery – 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries (48 guns)

III Corps (with I Army Sept. 5, with II Army Sept. 7)

Tuchkov CHQ – corps staff
3rd Infantry – Murom, Revel, Chernigov Rgts. (2 bns. ea), Selenginsk Rgt. (1 bn., with 1 detached to AHQ; regiment attached from IV Corps), 20th, 21st Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 11 bns. (may have also received back its 2 bns. of Combined Grenadiers from 1st Combined Grenadier Division as attachments for the battle on Sept. 7, but for game purposes
these are still shown with their parent division)
III Corps Light Artillery – 0.5 position battery, 1 light battery (18 guns)

IV Corps

Osterman-Tolstoi CHQ – corps staff
11th Infantry – Kexholm, Pernau, Polotsk, Yelets Rgts., 1st, 33rd Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns., + 1 bn. Combined Grenadiers remained attached (other detached to AHQ)
23rd Infantry – Yekaterinburg, Rylsk, Koporsk (regiment attached from IV Corps) Rgts., 18th Jaeger Rgt. (2 bns. ea.) = 8 bns.

(corporal may have also received 3 other bns. of Combined Grenadiers from 1st Combined Grenadier Division, along with the bn. it already had, as 2nd Combined Grenadier Brigade attached for the battle on Sept. 7, but for game purposes these are still shown with their parent division)
IV Corps Light Artillery – 1 position battery, 2.5 light batteries (42 guns)

V Guard Corps

Lavrov CHQ (in absence of Grand Duke Constantine) – corps staff
Guards Infantry – Life Guard Preobrazhenskii, Semyonovskii, Izmailovskii, Litovskii (Lithuanian), Finlyandskii (Finland), Jaeger Rgts. (3 bns. ea.), Marine Guard Equipage bn. = 19 bns.
1st Combined Grenadiers
Infantry – 9 Combined Grenadier bns. from 1st Grenadier, 3rd, 4th, 17th (2 bns. ea.), 23rd (1 bn.) Divisions (+ 1 Combined Grenadier bn. from 11th Div. that stayed with that division, and 1 Combined Grenadier bn. from 11th Division with AHQ, not counted in this total) – 4 bns. likely deployed forward in battle in 2nd Brigade with IV Corps (inc. 2 bns. from 17th Division, 1 bn. from 23rd Division, + 1 bn. already with 11th Division), and 2 bns. from 3rd Division may also have been deployed forward with their parent division again, while 4 bns. from 1st Grenadier, 4th Divisions in 1st Brigade clearly remained with 1st Combined Grenadier Division, but the two brigades and other detachments to III Corps remain united for game purposes
1st Cuirassier Cavalry – Chevalier Guard, Life Guard Horse, His Imperial Majesty’s Life Cuirassiers, Her Imperial Majesty’s Life Cuirassiers, Astrakhan Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 20 sq.
Guard Light Artillery – 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries, and 2 horse (only 8 guns each in horse) batteries, + 2 Marine Equipage guns (66 guns)

VI Corps

Dokhturov CHQ – corps staff
7th Infantry – Moscow, Pskov, Libau, Sofia Rgts., 11th, 36th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns.
24th Infantry – Ufa, Shirvan, Butyrsk, Tomsk Rgts., 19th, 40th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns.
VI Corps Heavy Artillery – 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries (48 guns).

Cossack Corps

Platov CHQ – corps staff
Cossack 2 Cavalry – 5 Don Cossack Rgts., inc. Ilovaisky V, Grekov XVIII, Denisov VII, Zhrov, Kharitonov VII (5 sq. ea.), Perekop Horse Tatar, Simferopol Horse Tatar Rgts. (5 sq. ea.) = 35 sq.
Cossack Horse Artillery – 2 horse batteries (24 guns)

II Army

Bagration AHQ – corps staff, 3rd Bug Cossack Rgt. (5 sq.), 1 Smolensk militia bn.
II Army Heavy Artillery – 2 position batteries (24 guns)
II Army Light Artillery – 4 2/3 light batteries (56 guns)

VII Corps

Rayevski CHQ – corps staff
26th Infantry – Nizhii Novgorod, Orel, Ladoga, Poltava Rgts. 5th, 42nd Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns.
VII Corps Heavy Artillery-1 position battery, 1 light battery (24 guns)

VIII Corps

Borozdin CHQ – corps staff
27th Infantry – Odessa, Tarnopol, Vilna, Simbirsk Rgts., 49th, 50th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns.
2nd Combined Grenadier Infantry – 11 Combined Grenadier bns. from 2nd Grenadier, 7th, 12th, 24th, 27th (2 each.) and 26th (1 bn.) Divisions; at least 7 bns. in one brigade remained with division during battle, while 4

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may have been deployed forward in another brigade with VI Corps in I Army, but the division remains united for game purposes

VIII Corps Heavy Artillery - 4.5 position batteries, 1/3 light battery (58 guns)

Cavalry Corps (not a formal corps like others, but aggregates the II Army cavalry, which was all under the authority of Golitsyn as the army’s cavalry commander)

Golitsyn CHQ – corps staff

2nd Cuirassier Cavalry – Yekaterinoslav, Military Order, Glukhov, Little Russia, Novgorod

Cuirassier Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 20 sq.

IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) – Kharkov, Chernigov, Kiev, Novorossiisk


Corps Horse Artillery – 2 horse batteries (24 guns)


Opolcheniye (Militia)

Moscow 1 Infantry – includes 1st, 2nd militia divisions, total 4 rgts., 16 bns.

Moscow 2 Infantry - includes 3rd militia division, total 4 rgts., 16 bns.

Smolensk Infantry – includes 11 “districts” (battalion equivalents)

Jaegers (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 – represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments.